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The purpose of the study is to analyze the widely-held opinion 
that foreign economic assistance does not meet the stated objectives of 
both the donor and recipient countries. The two major problems brought 
on by the assistance which are examined are (1) the procurement restric­
tions which reduce the grant element and increase the effective reate of 
interest and (2) the debt structuring and lack of coordination which con­
tribute to debt servicing. The hypothesis examined is that the donor's 
objectives, reflected in the design of the aid program, thrawt the 
theoretical expectations and contribute to the disillusionment with the 
assistance program.
A search of the literature and special studies measuring various 
aspects of foreign economic assistance was made and conclusions drawn 
regarding (1) the grant element in the flow of resources, (2) the effect 
of procurement restrictions on the value of assistance, (3) the balance- 
of-payments effect of procurement restrictions and (4) the sources of 
mounting debt-servicing burdens for recipient countries.
The discounted present value technique is applied to the flow of 
resources to estimate the donor's cost and the grant element to the 
recipient. Qualifying conditions such as procurement restrictions and 
contributions—in-kind are incorporated which indicate a reduction in 
value. In analyzing the balance—of-payments effect of procurement 
restrictions the donor's concern with domestic economic protection becomes 
clear in the design of the program. Although many studies indicate the 
excess price differentials involved in tied aid funds and the increase in 
effective interest rates, the aid programs continue to be designed with 
procurement restrictions. An analysis of the balance-of-payments cost 
of tied aid funds gives a more accurate picture of the donor's cost. The 
fact that funds are restricted in their use is neglected in the literature. 
The theoretical analysis of debt-servicing and the effect on net transfer 
of resources indicates the heavy cost incurred by developing countries 
in servicing assistance programs. The increase in funds necessary to 
service debt, combined with lagging foreign exchange earnings and long- 
run return on development projects creates balance-of-payments problems 
for aid recipients and a drain on their economy.
The principal findings, therefore, are: (1) the stated objectives 
of donors often deviate from the objectives made obvious in the design
iv
of the programs, (2) theoretical conclusions regarding the role of 
capital assistance in the development process may not materialize due 
to the design of the programs, (3) the grant element is reduced signi­
ficantly and the effective rate of interest increased in assistance 
programs due to procurement restrictions and the structuring of debt.
The recommendations are: (1) a more realistic evaluation of 
objectives and expectations regarding assistance, (2) design of the 
assistance programs to increase the effectiveness of the assistance,
(3) an awareness of the pending debt—servicing crises of recipient 
countries and establishment of international mechanism for dealing with 
debt rescheduling.
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THE EFFECT OF DEBT-SERVICING AND AID- 
TYING ON THE GRANT ELEMENT IN 
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to investigate various aspects 
of the two major problems associated with foreign economic assistance 
encountered by developing countries: (1) procurement restrictions,
i.e. aid-tying, and (2) debt-servicing burdens.
Disillusionment with the assistance program is expressed by 
both the donor and recipient. U.S. Congressional resistance to for­
eign economic assistance programs, referred to hereafter as assis­
tance, is expressed in reduced appropriations. Assistance is crit­
icized for failing to accomplish rapid development of the recipient.
It is the hypothesis of this study that the source of the disillusion­
ment with the ability of aid flows to promote a more rapid self- 
sustaining economic development is the conflict between the stated 
official objective and the design of the aid program. Conclusions
1
drawn from special studies and empirical testing of hypotheses regard­
ing existing aid programs provide the Information for comparison of 
aid programs to theoretical hypotheses and stated official objectives 
of assistance.
Donor countries, experiencing domestic economic pressures, 
began the practice of tying aid flows and hardening the loan terms.
The aid programs, as designed, do not reflect the official objective 
of economic development. Instead, the procurement restrictions and 
terms of the loans indicate a concern with economic protection of 
the donor, especially the donor's balance of payments, and contributes 
to the recipients problems due to the reduced value of aid and 
increased debt-servicing pressure. This relationship between the 
change in donor objectives and design of aid programs and the recip­
ient's debt-servicing problem is explored.
The literature is negligent in analyzing the conflict between 
the donor's official aid objective and the operation of the assistance 
program.
A search of the literature is made to determine the develop­
ment of problems relating to aid tying and debt servicing and the 
application of theoretical work to these problems. Statistical infor­
mation used in evaluating various aspects of the study are compiled 
from World Bank data. United Nations studies. The RAND Corporation 
studies, and various institutional and private studies. The relation­
ship between the objectives, theoretical expectations, and reality of 
assistance is defined.
The basic Issues examined are:
1. The effect of procurement restrictions on the real value 
of the aid commitment.
2. The extent to which national economic objectives of the 
donor are reflected in the design of the aid program.
3. The balance-of-payments cost of aid to the donor and the 
extent to which ald-tylng affects this cost.
4. The effect of the debt structure and mounting debt- 
servicing burdens on the recipient’s development.
In Chapter II, the framework Is established for investigat­
ing the hypothesis of the study— the extent to which the donor’s 
objectives, reflected in the design of the aid program, thrawt the 
theoretical expectations and contribute to disillusionment with the 
assistance program. The U.S. official objectives in providing 
assistance are traced historically through Presidential Addresses, 
official policies, and commentaries by statesmen and economists. 
Theories analyzing the role of capital assistance in the development 
process are reviewed to determine the results to be expected from the 
assistance funds.
The purpose of Chapter III Is to establish a definition of 
aid which Identifies the grant element In a flow of funds and gives a 
more accurate picture of the total cost of assistance to the U.S.
This definition should also give a more accurate measurement of the 
net transfer of resources to the recipient. Empirical studies 
applying the discounted present value methodology to the flow of
financial resources from developed to developing countries to estimate 
the real value of aid are reviewed. The results of studies conducted 
by the United Nations, World Bank, and John Plncus which estimate the 
extent to which procurement restrictions reduce the grant element in 
a flow of funds are summarized. The effectiveness of assistance may 
not meet the theoretical expectations since the net transfer of 
resources is not the same as the dollar value of the assistance.
In Chapter iV the design of aid programs is examined to 
determine the extent to which the policies practiced deviate from the 
official position on assistance and affect the real value of assistance. 
The U.S.'s objectives in placing procurement restrictions are traced 
through Presidential Messages and policies enacted. The extent to 
which aid-tying served the objective of protecting the donor's balance- 
of-payments position may detract from its effectiveness in achieving 
self-sustaining development by reducing the grant element, thus being 
one of the major problems facing developing countries. In Chapter IV 
theoretical work estimating the donor's short— and long-run balance- 
of-payments effect of tying and untying aid are reviewed and compared.
The second, and related, problem facing developing countries 
today is analyzed in Chapter V. The purpose of Chapter V is to 
examine the terms and structure of the flow of resources to determine 
the extent to which foreign capital contributes to the problems of 
developing countries. Theories describing the growth of debt-servicing 
burdens and debt-servicing capacity are surveyed. Statistical studies 
and reports of the United Nations and World Bank are examined to 
anticipate the problems In debt-servicing in the near future.
Alternative Institutional arrangements for coping with this problem 
are reviewed. The relationship between tied aid in Chapter XV and 
debt—servicing in Chapter V is examined. The manner in which aid- 
tying increases the effective rate of interest and contributes to the 
debt—servicing burden is explored.
A look at these results will allow decision-makers more 
accurate information in determining the size of aid flows, qualifying 
conditions to be attached to the aid programs, and realistic expecta­
tions and evaluations of aid performance. This could dispel some of 
the donor^s disillusionment with assistance.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
OBJECTIVES AND THEORIES DESCRIBING THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF ASSISTANCE IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
Donor and Recipient Objectives 
The objectives of economic development assistance depend on 
the point of view considered. From the recipient's viewpoint, the 
assistance is needed to supplement domestic savings and fill the 
resource gap to achieve long-run, self-sustained growth. In addition, 
the assistance relieves the foreign exchange shortage which often 
exists in developing countries.^
Achieving development as soon as possible is the primary objec­
tive of aid recipients. The economic position of the developing and 
developed countries are compared by Robert McNamara, the World Bank 
President;
During the First Development Decade, the total GNP of the world 
increased by $1,100 billion. . . . Only 6 per cent of the increase
^Gerald Meier, Leading Issues in Economic Development, 2d ed. 
(Fair Lawn, N.J.: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1970 ), pp. 251-252. 
Also, Edward Marcus and Mildren R. Marcus, Economic Progress and the 
Developing World (Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1971), pp.
46, 119-126. ^
vent to countries vhere per capita Incomes average $200 or less—  
but they contain 60 per cent of the world's people.
Today the average per capita Income In the developed countries 
Is approximately $2,400. The comparable figure for the developing 
countries is $180. By 1980 . . .  in the developed countries . . .  
per capita Income will have risen by some $1,200. The comparable 
Increase In the per capita income of the three-quarters of the 
world's people who live in the developing countries— even If the 
Second Development Decade growth objective is achieved— will be 
less than $100.2
McNamara puts developmental problems in perspective by a first­
hand account of one aspect of the problem:
The drift to the cities of the landless and the jobless is bound to 
Increase. Today the major cities are doubling In size roughly 
every decade. By the year 2000 their total population will be some 
500 per cent higher than today. More than a billion people will be 
seeking to make a living In these sprawling centers of urban decay.3
Urban planners in the U.S. who have encountered similar problems,
although on a much smaller scale, can certainly sympathize with the
multifarious problems of developing countries.
Financing development projects to accomplish GNP growth rate 
targets is only one use of assistance. Foreign exchange is needed not 
only to finance capital good imports required in the development process 
but also to service debt obligations on past borrowings. A 6 per cent 
GNP growth rate target was adopted by the UN General Assembly for the 
Second Development Decade. To accomplish this, foreign exchange earn­
ings must increase by 7 per cent per year. However, the foreign
^Robert S. McNamara, One Hundred Countries, Two Billion People 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 74-75.
3lbld.. pp. 71-72.
exchange needed to service the debt obligations on past borrowings is 
expected to Increase faster than the rate of Increase In national 
income. Therefore, foreign exchange earnings must Increase faster than 
the 7 per cent needed to accomplish the 6 per cent growth rate target.^
Experiencing such a strong need for assistance, recipients 
often develop an attitude which is criticized by donor countries. 
Leaders of the developing nations often make the assumption that an 
amount of assistance necessary to achieve stated per capita growth 
goals is an unconditional right. Increased trade opportunities, trade 
preferences, and "aid through trade" to insure a steady growth of 
export earnings is considered an obligation of developed countries.^
The donor country, in providing assistance, makes a choice 
among aid recipients and compares the recipients' benefits to the 
donor's costs and benefits. Donor objectives are:
1. Long-run, self-sustaining development of the recipient.
2. Humanitarian and maintenance of minimum income levels.
3. National security and political advantages to the donor.
4. Economic advantages to the donor.^
Foreign aid is only one component of a nation's foreign policy 
and the objectives are often so intertwined it is impossible to isolate
4lbid.
^Raymond F. Hikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid (Chicago: 
Aldine Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 22-24.
^Ibld.. pp. 1-20. Also, Hollis B. Chenery, "Effectiveness of 
Foreign Assistance," in Developing the Third World: The Experience of 
the Nineteen—Sixties, edited by Ronald Robinson (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1971), pp. 207-222.
a specific objective.7 According to some writers, aid Is the most 
Is^ortant means of furthering the purposes of American foreign policy. 
The role economic assistance is expected to play In accomplishing for­
eign policy objectives Is spelled out In Mllllkan and Rostow's book,
A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy. U.S. foreign policy Is 
assigned two priority tasks:
1. To provide security against overt military aggression.
2. To assist the development of a world In which U.S. security 
and way of life are not endangered.®
In the first task, economic assistance would solidify alliances and 
make them more effective militarily. The second task would reduce con­
flict because the national Interests of the democratic societies would 
be compatible with U.S. goals.9
Another well-respected writer, Pulitzer Prize winner Herbert
Pels, Indicates the close relationship between foreign aid and foreign
policy In the "Preface** to his book. Foreign Aid and Poreign Policy:
There Is still a genuine need to mesh more closely the problems of 
attaining material Improvement and those arising In the attempt to 
use foreign aid as an agent of foreign policy. I have tried to 
Indicate how the competence displayed In each of these fields 
affects the other; and why and how, therefore, diplomats must be 
economic judges and economists must be political prophets.10
.^Gerald Meier, "Foreign Aid: Economic Aspects,** International- 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, V, pp. 524-526.
®Max F. Mllllkan and W- W, Rostow, A Proposal: Key to an Effec­
tive Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 2-4.
9lbld.
lORerbert Fels, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (New York: Dell 
Publishing Co., Inc., 1966), p. vll.
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A moral commitment was added to development assistance by
President John P. Kennedy:
To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe strug­
gling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts 
to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required . . . 
because it is right.11
Although the messages and commentaries are encouraging and full 
of good intentions, the official statements of foreign economic assis­
tance policies are often general and vague. Political, national secur­
ity, and humanitarian motives are often combined in an official state­
ment such as that made by President Kennedy :
The 1960*s can be— and must be— the crucial "decade of development" 
— the period when many less-developed nations can make the transi­
tion into self-sustained growth— the period in which an enlarged 
community of free, stable, and self-reliant nations can reduce 
world tensions and insecurity. . . .
. . .  we are launching a "decade of development" on which will 
depend, substantially, the kind of world in which we and our child­
ren will live,12
The official position on foreign economic assistance under the 
Johnson administration is stated in the following quotation of President 
Johnson:
For our own security and well-being, and as responsible free men, 
we must seek to share our capacity for growth, and the promise of a 
better life, with out fellow man around the world. That is what 
foreign aid is all about.13
llMichael Kent O'Leary, The Politics of American Foreign Aid, 
quoting President Kennedy (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), p. 3.
12u.S., President John F. Kennedy, "Message of the President 
to the Congress," March 22, 1961, quoted in Robert A. Goldwin, ed.. 
Foreign Aid? (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1962), pp. 4, 9.
13Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, p. 6 quoting Presi­
dent Lyndon B. Johnson, "Foreign Aid Message to Congress," January 14, 
1965.
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However» the exact procedures to follow to accomplish these 
stated objectives are rarely given. The question becomes, can foreign 
aid serve both as an instrument of development and as an instrument of 
foreign policy.
The emphasis in foreign economic assistance programs has 
changed over time. In the 1950*s an attempt was made to strengthen 
allies against Communist invasion and this became the primary justifi­
cation for economic development assistance. As early as President 
Truman’s inaugural address of January 20, 1949, in which he declared 
his famous "Point Four" Program, Americans were encouraged to support 
economic development programs to ward off military threats.However, 
the emphasis has changed and during the 1970's the direction has been 
toward the development of countries to demonstrate the ability to 
achieve high growth rates in a democratic framework,
The current approach of the assistance programs is criticized 
by Milton Friedman, He offers the alternative approach of strengthen­
ing the private enterprise sector in the developing countries instead 
of supporting government development plans and projects:
Though foreign economic aid may win us some temporary allies, in 
the long run it will almost surely retard economic development and 
promote the triumph of Communism. It is playing into our enemies * 
hands, and should be abolished. Instead we should concentrate on
14o*Leary, The Politics of American Foreign Aid, pp. 6-10. 
Also, Robert E. Asher, Development Assistance in the Seventies. Alter­
natives for the United States (Washington, B.C.,: The Brookings Institu­
tion, 1970), p. 22; Charles P. Kindleberger, Economic Development (2d 
ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), pp. 365-366.
^^Asher, pp. 22-27.
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promoting world-wide economic development through means that are 
consonant with the American tradition Itself—-strengthening of 
free market domestic economies in the less—developed nations, the 
removal of obstacles to private international trade, and the fos­
tering of a climate favorable to private international investment.
Over time, it has also been recognized that the objectives of 
security and peace are not always compatible with economic development. 
The assumption that economic development brings political stability and 
insures security, peace, and freedom can no longer be made. Political 
revolutions may be the consequence of economic development.^^ If the 
developing country becomes aware of the gap in levels of living between 
the developed and developing economies and if ambitions increase faster 
than capacity, political unrest may result.^®
The final donor objective of foreign aid, economic advantage 
for the donor, is probably the most severely criticized. Statistics 
support the complaint that aid—tying overvalues the amount of aid, 
increases debt—servicing burdens, and distorts the allocation of re­
sources of the recipient away from high priority development projects 
to projects tailored to fit the aid.19
The hypothesis that aid will provide a market for exports has 
both supporters and critics. Robert Asher supports the position that
^^Milton Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objec­
tives," in The United States and the Developing Economies, ed. by 
Gustav Ranis (New York: W. W. Norton SCompany, Inc., 1964), p. 25.
^^U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970*s: A New Approach. Re­
port to the President from the Task Force on International Development, 
Rudolph A, Peterson, chairman, March 4, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1970), p. 2.
^^Kindleberger, Economic Development, p. 366-
^^Chenery, "Effectiveness of Foreign Assistance," p. 218.
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economic development can widen the market for the donor's exports:
"Poor countries make poor markets. Better markets • • • will buy more 
exports from the U.S. and buy more from third countries which. In turn, 
may be able to buy more U.S. p r o d u c t s . "^0 However, Kindleberger, Mason, 
and Hikesell all agree that aid can not be justified on economic grounds 
alone.21 Economic development has both market-creating and market- 
destroying power. Market expansion Is a result of Increased Imports 
as the level of Income Increases and market-destructlon is the result 
of import—substitution Industries being established.^^
Current Direction of U.S. Objectives
The current direction of thought is to Integrate aid, trade, 
and Investment, remembering that development is a long-run process and
is a multilateral e n t e r p r i s e . ^3
President Nixon recognized the need to redirect assistance. A 
Presidential Task Force on International Development was appointed in 
1969 with Rudolph A. Peterson as the chairman to provide a report with 
comprehensive recommendations concerning the role of the U.S. in assis­
ting less developed countries in the 1970’s. Fourteen conditions and 
recommendations were made by the task force. It was discovered that
^®Asher, Development Assistance in the Seventies, p. 27.
2lEdward S. Mason, "United States Interests In Foreign Assis­
tance," in The United States and the Developing Economies, ed. by Ranis, 
pp. 18-19. Also, Kindleberger, Economic Development, p. 361; Mikesell, 
The Economics of Foreign Aid, pp. 11—12.
^^Kindleberger, pp. 361-365.
23Asher, Development Assistance in the Seventies. pp. 219—229.
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only 16 per cent of the foreign assistance funds were actually used for 
economic progress. The percentages of funds for the three major cate­
gories were: Security Assistance, 52 per cent; Welfare and Emergency 
Relief, 6 per cent; and International Development Assistance, 42 per 
cent with 26 per cent of these funds being used for security p u r p o s e s . 2 4
The relationship of international development to U.S. national 
interest was defined as follows:
International development assistance serves long-term U.S. 
national interests. . . .
In the past, the line of demarcation between security and dev­
elopment interests was blurred. . . .  foreign assistance was justi­
fied in terms of the conflict between East and West. Today all 
countries have a common interest in building and maintaining a 
global environment in which each can prosper.
Two reasons for an active U.S. role in international develop­
ment are paramount.
First, the United States has an abiding interest in bringing 
nations together to serve common needs. It has consistently taken 
a position of leadership in creating institutions like the United 
Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, and 
in promoting cooperation in trade, investment, and arms control.
The size and power of the United States gives us a special respon­
sibility; if this country chooses not to play a major role, it 
necessarily endangers the success of such ventures.
Second, the developing countries contain two-thirds of the 
world's population. Their future success or failure will influence 
profoundly the kind of world we live in. The nations of the world 
are growing more interdependent— in trade, in finance, in techno­
logy, and in the critical area of political change. U.S. decision­
making in such important areas as military expenditures will be 
Influenced by the amount of turbulence in the developing countries 
of the world, and U.S. prosperity will be influenced by their 
economic p r o g r e s s .  2 5  ,
24xj.s. Foreign Assistance in the 1970's: A New Approach,
Peterson, Chairman, pp. 5-6. 
25ibid.. p. 7.
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The Role of Capital Assistance in 
Economic Development
Introduction
The primary objective of economic development assistance for 
both the donor and recipient Is to achieve self-sustaining economic dev­
elopment . Development Is a long-run process, an Interaction of economic, 
social, and political variables ”. . .  never ending, destructive as well 
as construction.”26 The task of attaining development can,not be con­
sidered complete by achieving a specific level of per capita Income but 
is recognized In the changes In productive processes and the formation 
of Ideas and attitudes.2? Foreign economic assistance Is praised as 
Indispensable to the process of development by some authorlties2® and 
is criticized as Ineffective and adversely affecting development by 
others.29 The question then becomes: What contribution can assistance 
make to the development of the recipient country?
Once a country establishes a growth target, the amount of capi­
tal needed to accomplish this target Is estimated. The significant 
variables are the domestic saving and Investment, exports and Imports, 
annual population growth rate, and the marginal capital-output ratios.
2®Asher, Development Assistance in the Seventies, p. 40.
2^Ibld., 39-40. Also, Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development, 
Problems, Principles, and Policies (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
Inc., 1968), pp. 578-579.
2^Ibld.
29peter Bauer, "UNCTAD and Africa,” In Leading Issues, ed. by 
Meier, pp. 280-284.
K. Hawkins, "Measuring Capital Requirements," in Leading 
Issues, ed. by Meier, pp. 253-256. Also, Gerald M. Meier, "Foreign Aid: 
Economic Aspects," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. V, 
525.
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The presence of constraints on the development process is evident by 
the very nature of the underdeveloped condition. These constraints fall 
Into three broad categories: (1) the savlng-lnvestment gap, (2) the 
foreign exchange shortage, and (3) the limited capital absorptive capac­
ity. 31
The saving—investment gap is the difference in the predicted 
domestic saving and the amount of capital needed to accomplish the 
stated growth target.
The shortage of foreign exchange as a limitation on development 
can exist in the absence of a saving-investment gap. Foreign produced 
capital goods are often complementary to domestic production since 
most developing countries produce only a limited range of products. The 
domestic saving then must be converted into foreign exchange to make 
these purchases. If the release of resources through the reduction in 
consumption and increase in saving does not make the type of resources 
available for obtaining foreign exchange, development is limited.
The inflow of capital goods is of little use if the capital is 
not put to use in the productive process. The ability of a country to 
absorb an increase in capital goods depends upon the entrepreneurship, 
public and private administration, skilled workers and technicians.
The lack of these human and institutional qualities is a limit on
^^Hawkins, "Measuring Capital Requirements," pp. 254-257. Also, 
Mikesell, The Economics of Aid, p. 71.
33ibld.
33Ibid.
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de'velopmen't referred to as capital, absorption capacity.34
Foreign aid is expected to fill these gaps and overcome these 
constraints to enable countries to achieve self-sustaining growth and a 
gradual reduction and termination of aid. To accomplish this, marginal 
propensity to save must exceed average propensity to save and the 
investment channeled into strategic projects with low import content or 
import-substitution industries and contribute to an expansion of the
export sectors.35
The theoretical approach to determining the role of foreign 
aid to development suffers several limitations. One such limitation is 
the difficulty in obtaining a precise measurement of the capital—output 
ratios, saving ratios, and population growth rates. Another limitation 
is the treatment of the relationship of the variables as mechanical 
which obstructs many of the subtleties of the development process. 
Lastly, the models arc highly aggregative and treat all units of 
investment and capital inflow as homogeneous units.
Theories of the Role of Assistance 
. Theories regarding the essence of development can be classified 
as partial or comprehensive. Three of the most Important partial 
theories relate to capital-absorptive capacity, critical minimum 
effort, and intersectorial growth models.
34%bid. Also, Benjamin Higgins, United Nations and the U.S. 
Foreign Economic Policy (Homewood, 111: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962), 
pp. 22—26; Higgins, Economic Development, p. 580.
35Meier, "Foreign Aid: Economic Aspects," pp. 525-526,
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Capital-absorptive capacity
The estimated capital required for "take-off" establishes the 
amount of capital that can be effectively used, i.e. the capital- 
absorptive capacity of a country. The marginal contribution of invest­
ment is defined as the change in national income resulting from addi­
tional investment stimulating the economy and development taking place. 
The limit of a country's absorptive capacity is reached when an addi­
tional unit of investment reduces the marginal contribution of invest­
ment to "x". The value of "x" is determined by the rate of interest 
on development loans, or zero if a grant is provided.
The real limit on a country's ability to use capital effec­
tively is established by the nature of the underdeveloped state. Such 
factors as lack of entrepreneurship, cultural and social Impediments 
to technological change and innovation, inefficiency of public and 
private administration, lack of technicians and skilled workers and 
the low level of education in general, and the immobility of produc­
tive resources.
These factors prevent the developing countries from produc­
tively employing additional amounts of capital which are provided
3^Higgins, Economic Development, pp. 579-582. Also, Higgins, 
United Nations and the U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, pp. 22-26.
3^Hollis B. Chenery and Alan M. Strout, "Foreign Assistance 
and Economic Development," American Economic Review. LVI, No. 4 
(September, 1966), pp. 680-681. Also, Roy F. Harrod, Towards a 
Dynamic Economics (London: Macmillan, 1948), cited in Mikesell, The 
Economics of Foreign Aid, p. 99.
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through, assistance programs. It is essential» therefore» that foreign 
aid be employed in strategic ways which remove bottlenecks. This 
would increase not only the productivity of the foreign assistance 
but also the domestic investment. To overcome the capital absorptive 
limitation» new techniques» skills, and methods of production and dis­
tribution must be introduced-^®
Many comprehensive development theories incorporate cultural 
and institutional factors which affect the capital absorptive cap­
acity into their models. For example, the Chenery-Strout model 
includes the "skills limit" factor»®^ and Roy Harrod employs the 
"natural rate of growth” which is determined by population and skills.
Critical minimum effort
A critical minimum level of per capita income must be reached 
before sustained growth can take place. A small increase is considered 
a handicap to the development process since it only stimulates the 
socio-economic factors which retard growth such as: (1) population 
growth, (2) increased marginal capital-output ratio, (3) depressed 
entrepreneurial activity, and (4) resistance to new ideas and tech­
nical progress. These factors depress the level of income at a 
"low-level equilibrium trap." If per capita income can be increased 
to a "critical minimum effort" level the growth-inducing forces of
3®Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, pp. 99, 103—104.
®^Chenery and Strout, "Foreign Assistance and Economic Devel­
opment," pp. 680-681.
^®Harrod, Towards a Dynamic Economics, p. 99.
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saving» investment» and changes in socio-economic structure will over­
come the depressing forces. Therefore, in order for economic assis­
tance to he of any value it must he provided in the amount and type 
to hreak through the harriers to the critical minimum effort and enable 
the growth—inducing forces to overpower the depressing forces,
Intersectoral growth models
Comprehensive growth models are often criticized as heing too 
highly aggregated. The disaggregated, intersectoral growth models 
analyze the productive process of various sectors of the economy and 
the interaction of the sectors or industries. The value of these 
theories is in identifying "leading" or strategic sectors which induce 
expansion of investment and output in other sectors. The "linkage" 
effects of some sectors stimulate the growth potential in the economy 
because of the way in which the factors of production and output of 
each sector are related. If these sectors can he Identified and aid 
directed toward their development, self-sustaining growth will be
enhanced.42
4^Harvey Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness and Economic 
Growth (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957). Also, Richard R. Nelson,
"A Theory of the Low-Level Equilibrium Trap in Underdeveloped Coun­
tries," American Economic Review, XLXI (December, 1956), 894—908 cited 
by Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, pp. 47—50,
^^Albert 0. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development 
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958). Also, Hollis B.
Chenery and Paul G. Clark, Inter-Industry Economics (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1959); Tibor Barna, ed. Structural Interdependence and 
Economic Development (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963); A- T. Pea­
cock and Douglas Dosser, "Input-Output Analysis in an Underdeveloped 
Country, A Case Study," Review of Economic Studies, XXV (October, 1959), 
21-24.
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Four comprehensive theories of development In which foreign 
economic assistance plays a significant role are discussed In this 
study. They are Rostow’s stages of economic growth, CheneryrStrout 
con^rehenslve model, the Fel-Paauw saving constraint model, and 
McKinnon's foreign exchange constraint. These theories are comprehen­
sive In that many factors are considered simultaneously.
Rostow's "take-off" stage
The social, cultural, and other environmental prerequisites 
for economic progress are significant factors In Rostow's explanation 
of stages of development. Rostow's third stage, "take-off Into self- 
sustaining growth," has become standard equipment In forelgn-ald 
policies. According to Rostow, the prerequisites for take-off are
(1) an Investment rate greater than 10 per cent of national Income,
(2) the development of a leading sector, and (3) a stable political, 
social and Institutional framework favorable to economic growth.
Rostow's comprehensive model Is historical In approach and 
depends very much upon the establishment of a framework capable of 
mobilizing and transmitting capital from one sector to another. For­
eign aid can be of assistance In helping a country reach the critical 
level of Investment called for In the self-sustaining growth stage.
A final element In the supply of loanable funds Is, of course, 
capital Imports. Foreign capital has played a major role in the 
take-off stage of many economies; for example the United States, 
Russia, Sweden, Canada. • . • Foreign capital was notably useful
A3W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist 
Manifesto (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1960),
p. 39.
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when the construction of railways or other large overhead capital 
Items with a long period of gestation played an Important role 
In the take-off or the late preconditions period. . . . foreign 
capital can be mightily useful In helping carry the burden of 
these overhead items either directly or Indirectly.
Chenery-Strout comprehensive 
model
The Chenery-Strout model combines the savings-lnvestment gap, 
the foreign-exchange gap, and the capital-absorptive capacity in deter­
mining the role of foreign aid In the development process. Foreign 
assistance can provide the prerequisites for the take-off stage such as 
skills, organizational ability and technology, and encouragement of 
self-help measures.
The amount of aid required to achieve a 10 per cent growth in 
Investment for take-off Is: F^ = F^ + (Bfe - ct*) (V^ - where F^
Is the net Inflow of foreign capital, F^ = - S^ Is the initial sav-
Ings-investment gap, **. . . the Increment in investment in each period 
is a constant ratio (Sfe) to the increment in GNP,"^^ a* is the mar­
ginal propensity to save, and is the level of GNP in year Æ.
The conclusions of the model regarding the effectiveness of 
external assistance in promoting development are:
1. "In the short run the effectiveness of external resources 
depends on their use to relieve shortages of skills, sav­
ing, and imported commodities-"^^
44ibid.. p. 49-
^^Chenery and Strout, "Foreign Assistance and Economic Devel- 
opment," pp. 680-681.
46lbid.. p. 687. 4 8 ^ ^ ^  p. 724.
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2. "The long-run effectiveness of assistance is also likely . 
to be increased by supporting as high a growth rate as the 
economy can achieve without a substantial deterioration in 
the efficiency of use of capital.
3. "Limiting the form of assistance to the machinery and equip­
ment needed by substantial investment projects is likely 
either to lower the rate of growth or to distort the pat­
tern of investment.
The model is comprehensive in the sense that most possibilities 
arising in the course of providing economic assistance for development 
are included. The assistance should contribute to the mobilization and 
use of domestic resources by alleviating bottlenecks. The conclusions 
are also in agreement with the "critical minimum effort" approach.
When the maximum growth rate established by capital absorptive capacity 
is achieved, the increase in GNP is less likely to be offset by popula­
tion growth. The economy also benefits from a rapid increase in savings 
rate, expansion of exports, and the country becomes more attractive to 
foreign private investment. The final conclusion supports the widely 
held contention that tied aid becomes increasingly inappropriate as 
development processes start.
These conclusions support the use of economic assistance for 
development purposes and make recommendations for improvement.
^°Ibld.. p. 727.
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Fel-Faauw saving (self- 
help) constraint
The Fei-Paauw theory is primarily concerned wlf:h the savings 
constraint and the contribution foreign aid can make when the domestic 
economy has maximized savings efforts and still falls short of the funds 
needed to achieve self-sustained growthf^ Two of the three cases dis­
cussed call for assistance. In one case a termination date for provid­
ing assistance can be seen but not in the second case:
Case 1. T\0 < k +  n. < a/k. =  t\u
Case 2. t\ll <  h  +  ^
where t \ 0  is the initial rate of growth of capital and GNP, k  is the tar­
get rate of growth in per capita GNP, ^ is the rate of population 
growth, u  is the per capita marginal savings ratio, k  is the capital-
output ratio, and na is the long-run rate of growth of capital and GNP.
Case 1: The Aid is "gap-filling" and complements the country's
own self-help efforts. The long-run growth rate of capital and GNP 
(nti.) is greater than the sum of the target per capita growth rate of 
GNP and the rate of population growth (h +
Case 2: The long-run rate of growth of capital and GNP (nU) 
is less than the sum of the target rate of growth of GNP and the rate 
of population growth (/i + Æ). Foreign aid will be "gap narrowing" and
^^John C. H, Fei and D. S. Paauw, "Foreign Assistance and Self- 
Help: A Reappraisal of Development Finance," Review of Economics and 
Statistics, XLVII (August, 1965), 251—267 cited by Mikesell, The Econ­
omics of Foreign Aid, pp. 87-89.
^^Ibld.. p. 87.
^^Ibld.. pp. 87-89.
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technical assistance will be necessary to increase self-help efforts 
to raise the per capital marginal savings ratio.
McKinnon's foreign exchange 
constraint
If aid is strategically used to remove bottlenecks, a small 
amount of aid can have a significant impact on the growth rate. If 
the foreign exchange constraint is dominant, foreign aid can be used 
to provide strategic goods not produced in the developing country.
How long aid must be provided before the growth becomes self- 
sustaining is determined by 2.', the net marginal propensity to export 
over and above current account requirements, exceeding e., the export 
capacity coefficient, by a critical amount. The greater 2.' exceeds the 
critical ratio (the amount by which 2 ' > 2), the smaller the total 
amount of aid necessary to fill the trade gap for achieving self­
sustained growth-
Criticism of Aid as an Instrument 
of Development
Not all authorities on foreign aid agree that foreign aid con­
tributes to the development of the recipient,However, very few 
writers are as critical as Peter Bauer^^ who believes that not only is
R. I. McKinnon, "Foreign Exchange Constraints in Economic 
Development and Efficient Aid Allocation," Economic Journal, LXXIV 
(June, 1964), 388-409 cited by Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, 
pp. 89-91-
^^Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objectives," pp.
13-24.
^^Bauer, "UNCTAD and Africa," pp. 280-284.
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aid ineffective in promoting developing but actually serves as a major 
deterrent to the development process. The policies related to the use 
of aid funds discourage capital development in the private sector of 
the recipient's economy.
Economic development depends not only on the supply of capital 
but on the human qualities of attitude, values, objectives, motiva­
tions, and the social and political institutions. Foreign aid is 
incapable of affecting these human qualities and therefore is ineffec­
tive as an instrument of development.
The inflow of aid, according to Bauer, adversely affects 
these essential human qualities by undermining the idea of self-reli­
ance and instilling the attitude that development depends on external 
grants thus relieving the people of the responsibility of personal 
development.
When resources are supplied locally, the human qualities and 
productive institutions necessary in the productive process are rein­
forced and improved and provide a basis for further economic develop-
Summary and Conclusions 
Although several objectives for providing economic develop­
ment assistance were explored in the first part of this chapter, the 
ultimate justification from both the donor and recipient viewpoint is 
to achieve self-sustained growth. The issues, then, are: (1) how can 
aid assist the development process and (2) how long must the assistance
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continue before the recipient economy responds and growth, becomes 
self-sustaining.
It must first be recognized that development is a long-term 
procedure and is a process involving more than economic variables. 
Developing countries face many obstacles in their efforts to reach the 
"take-off" stage of development. The three paramount obstacles are the 
savings-investment constraint, foreign exchange shortage, and limited 
capital-absorptive capacity. If foreign aid is to be of any value, it 
must contribute to the elimination of one or all of these bottlenecks.
The value of the theories relating foreign aid to the develop­
ment process is in pointing out the principal variables and predicting 
the development results under alternative assumptions. The "critical 
minimum effort" theory indicates a minimum amount of growth must take 
place to overcome the depressing forces which are stimulated when the 
status quo is disturbed. The intersectorial growth models point to 
specific sectors which are capable of inducing growth in related in­
dustries. Rostow’s "take-off" stage is considered the point at which 
the development process can proceed to achieve self-sustaining growth. 
The Chenery-Strout model is probably the most comprehensive analysis 
of the development process and the significant variables.
Although foreign aid as an instrument of development is not 
without its critics, most theories reach the conclusion that foreign 
aid can provide the necessary, missing ingredients for the developing 
countries to achieve self-sustaining growth.
CHAPTER III
DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
Introduction
A variety of flows of resources from developed to developing 
countries are referred to as "aid." Although the objective of the 
transfer of resources may be a monetary return or military or political 
concession the term "aid" is often interpreted to mean a gift.
In this chapter, procedures for determining the grant element
59in the flow of funds are reviewed. First, John Pincus’s pioneer work 
in application of the discounted present value technique to economic 
development assistance is presented from both the donor and recipient's 
point of view. Secondly, the merits of transferring funds by means of 
a grant or a loan are compared. Since the grant element is the amount
^^John A. Pincus, "The Cost of Foreign Aid," Review of Econ­
omics and Statistics, XLV, No, 1 (February, 1966), pp. 360-367.
Also, John A. Pincus, Economic Aid and International Cost Sharing. A 
Report Prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
International Security Affairs, R-431-ISA (Santa Monica, Calif.: The 
RAND Corporation, July, 1965).
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actually transferred to the recipient, the question is raised as to 
why the loan is ever used. The merits of each instrument are reviewed 
in Wilson Schmidt's renowned work,
Thirdly, nonquantitative factors which affect the degree of 
concession in a flow of funds, often more significantly than the fin­
ancial terms, are discussed. Procurement restrictions have been used 
increasingly over the past ten years. However, the measurement of 
their influence is difficult. The formula developed by Janos Horvath^^ 
introduces a technique for incorporating the tied-aid influence on the 
grant element. Also, UN studies indicating the degree to which aid- 
tying has reduced the grant element are reviewed.
Determining the Definition of Aid 
The Criteria
The recommended criteria for establishing a definition of 
economic development assistance are:
1. The primary objective of the funds is development of the 
recipient's economy.
2. Assistance with military objectives is excluded.
^^Wilson E. Schmidt, "The Economics of Charity: Loans versus 
Grants," Journal of Political Economy, LXXII, No. 4 (1964), 387-395,
Jonas Horvath, "Foreign Economic Aid in the International 
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences: A Review Article," Journal of Economic 
Literature, IX, No. 2 (June, 1971), pp. 432-441.
^^"These differences between the official and the economically 
scientific measurement of development assistance have undoubtedly play­
ed a significant part in the growing disillusionment with the effec­
tiveness of development assistance, as has the fact that much so-called 
aid has been given for political and military purposes rather than the
30
3. The assistance is provided on concessional terms.
A review of the funds provided to developing countries reveals 
that objectives other than economic development of the recipient are 
pursued In the design of the aid program. See Chapter II for a dis­
cussion of the donor's objectives.
The second criterion, separation of development and military
programs. Is a difficult task. The need for the separation has long
been recognized and was one of the recommendations made to the U.S.
President by the Task Force on International Development In 1970:
4. U.S. international development programs should be independent 
of U.S. military and economic programs that provide assistance for 
security purposes. Both types of programs are essential, but each 
serves a different purpose. Confusing them in concept and connect?^ 
ing them in administration detract from the effectiveness of both.
Because of the relationship between world-wide development and U.S.
security and because of fungibility^^ of funds, it is often difficult
to distinguish budget commitments for development purposes and those
for military considerations.^^
promotion of economic development, and may well Indeed have been coun­
ter-productive in terms of promoting development.” Harry Johnson, "The 
'Crisis of Aid" and the Pearson Report," A Lecture Delivered at the 
University of Edinburgh on June 3, 1970 (Edinburgh: University Press, 
1970), p. 8.
^^U.S, Foreign Assistance in the 1970's: A New Approach, 
Peterson, Chairman, p. 2.
^ungibllity refers to aid funds used to purchase goods nor— 
mally purchased by the aid recipient through normal commercial routes 
with free foreign exchange. Fungibility is also referred to in the 
literature as "switching" and "tied aid substitution."
Mllllkan and Rostow, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign 
Policy, pp. 1—23. Also, Horvath, "Foreign Economic Aid, A Review Arti­
cle," pp. 433-435.
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To employ the third criterion that funds be provided on con­
cessional terms it is necessary to determine the degree of concession 
in the wide range of terms on which funds are made available. The 1 per 
cent of GNP target which Development Assistance Committee (DAC) coun­
tries^^ have pledged includes such nonconcessionary funds as private 
flows, which made up 45 per cent of the flow in 1975. The account.
Net Flow of Financial Resources from DAC countries, is composed of the 
following categories:
I. Official Development Assistance
1, Bilateral grants and grant—like flows
2, Bilateral loans at concessional terms
3, Contributions to multilateral institutions
II. Other Official Flows
1- Bilateral (official export credits, official equity 
investment)
2. Multilateral (purchase of loan participations and 
bonds issued by multilateral agencies, debt relief 
transactions)
XII. Private Flows
1. Direct investment
2. Bilateral portfolio
^^Participating in the work of DAC are: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United King­
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America 
and the Commission of the European Communities.
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3. Multilateral portfolio
4. Export credits^^
This account is not an accurate measurement of the net transfer 
of resources to the recipient nor Is It the same as the "real cost" to 
the donor. To be defined as "aid" the funds must be provided on terms 
unattractive to private capital flows, which are determined by the ex­
pected return compared with the risks Involved. The market mechanism 
reflects the collective judgments In rates of interest and terms of debt 
Instruments. For a financial arrangement to be defined as aid. It must 
be accepted that the terms are concessionary to the extent that the pri­
vate market criteria do not apply,
"Aid" is the Grant Element
The definition of aid used in this study is the grant element 
in a flow of resources, determined by the discounted present value meth­
odology. A grant can be viewed as a loan with a 100 per cent subsidy.
It is defined as ". . . a unilateral transfer to the recipient country, 
with no obligation to repay the amount and no charges for the use of 
the funds in the form of interest payments . .
^^Development Co-operation. 1972 Review. Efforts and Policies 
of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee. Report of the 
Development Assistance Committee, Edwin M. Martin, Chairman (Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1972), pp. 1-9, 
46-48.
^^Pincus, "The Cost of Foreign Aid," pp. 360-367. Also, Egon 
Neuberger, "Foreign Aid— Is it Worth Continuing?" (Santa Monica, Calif.: 
The RAND Corporation, April, 1964), p. 4; E. K. Hawkins, The Principles 
of Development Aid (Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1970), pp. 17-19, 28; 
Meier, "Foreign Aid: Economic Aspects," p. 521-
^^Hawkins, The Principles of Development Aid, p. 30.
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The grant element in a loan is the difference in the present 
value of the loan and the obligation to repay. This difference for 
"hard” loans, defined as loans repayable in the lender's currency and 
at market rates of interest, is zero; there is no grant element or aid 
value. For "soft" loans, defined as loans repayable in the borrower's 
currency and at interest rates less than the market rate, it is neces­
sary to calculate " . . .  the mean of the probability distribution that 
the interest and capital repayment will be useful to the lender without 
an implicit foreign exchange d i s c o u n t . I f  the probability of the 
debt service being converted into foreign exchange is exactly half, the 
soft loan may, at market rates of interest then be regarded as half aid 
and half business. According to Charles Kindleberger, aid figures do 
not correctly define the grant element: ". • . these subtle calculations 
are altogether ignored, and aid is aid, no matter how closely the terms 
approach the market."
The grant element can be measured from the donor or recipient's 
viewpoint. This difference in point of view is often a source of con­
fusion in aid literature. To the donor the grant element is the real
resource cost of the aid. To the recipient it is the net transfer of 
72resources. The discounted present value methodology is based on the
^^Charles P. Kindleberger, International Economics (4th ed.: 
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), p. 411-
John A. Pincus, "Costs and Benefits of Aid: An Empirical 
Analysis," in Leading Issues in Economic Development, ed. by Gerald 
Meier, pp. 257-266. Also, Hawkins, The Principles of Development Aid, 
p. 40.
34
logic that current funds are worth more than the same amount of future
funds. The faster the loan is repaid, the smaller the opportunity cost
for the donor. For the aid recipient, the longer repayment is postponed,
the greater the grant element. The most significant factor in computing
the grant element is the rate of discount used, which is not the same
73for the donor and the recipient.
Limitations of the grant 
element methodology
There are several limitations in using the grant element cal­
culated from financial terms as a measurement of the aid value to recip­
ients or the real cost of the assistance to the donor.
1. By considering only the financial aspects of the funds, 
qualitative features of the assistance which have a direct 
bearing on the transfer of resources, such as aid-tying, 
are not taken into consideration.^^
2. Direct and indirect benefits and costs accruing to the 
donor, such as commercial ties and increased profit on 
private foreign investment, and recipient, such as trans­
fer of technology, are difficult to identify and quantify.
3. The rate of discount to be used is not easily determined.
74Hawkins, The Principles of Development Aid, p. 40; Also, 
Neuberger, "Foreign Aid— Is it Worth Continuing?", pp. 5-6; Mikesell,
The Economics of Aid, pp. 227—234, 246—248,
^^Pincus, "Costs and Benefits of Aid: An Empirical Analysis," 
pp. 257-266.
^^Pincus, Economic Aid and International Cost Sharing, pp. 124—
125.
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4. Many types of aid, such as investment guarantee and tax in­
centives given to private investors, are not taken into 
77account.
The effect of these conditions are qualitative in nature. How- 
even, when information is available, they should be expressed in quanti­
tative terms.
Measuring the Grant Element 
Discounted Present Value Technique
The grant element is estimated for both the donor and the recip­
ient. From the donor's point of view the real cost incurred in provid­
ing funds is the income foregone, estimated on the basis of the alter­
native uses and rates of return of the funds. The present value of 
the loan is determined by discounting the repayment streams of interest 
and amortization at various long-term rates of interest. The difference 
between the face value of the loan and the present value is the grant 
e l e m e n t - T h e  grant element must then be qualified for such condi­
tions as aid-tying, contributions-in-kind, and monopoly elements dis­
cussed later.
The grant element is calculated from the donor's viewpoint for 
three terms and summarized in Table 1. The loans are repayable in U.S.
^^Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, pp. 204—218, 222-226.
^^Pincus, "The Cost of Foreign Aid," pp. 360—367. Also, Pin­
cus, Economic Aid and International Cost Sharing; Pincus, "Costs and 
Benefits of the Aid," ed- by Meier, Leading Issues, pp. 257-268.
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dollars. A 7 per cent rate of discount was chosen to represent the 
opportunity cost of the funds loaned as foreign aid. A lower discount 
rate would have reduced the grant element. For example, if the Export— 
Dnport Bank loan had been discounted at 5 3/4 per cent, the discounted 
present value would have been $3,500,000, equal to the face value, and 
the grant element would have been zero. As the discount rate increases, 
the donor's opportunity cost increases and the grant element increases 
from the donor's point of view.
TABLE 1
GRANT ELEMENT ACCORDING TO DISCOUNTED 
PRESENT VALUE METHODOLOGY
Agency
Amount 
of Loan^
Interest
Rate
Loan Term and 
Grace Period
Discounted 
Pre. Val.b
Grant
Element^
Ex—Im Bank $ 3,500 5.70 % 7 yr + 2 yr $ 3,102.5 $ 397.5 
(11.35)
ica "^ ,3,500 4.00 % 7 yr+ 3 l/2yr 2,888.5 611.5 
, (17,47)
AID® 65,000 0.75 % 30yr + 10 yr 17,645.0 47,355.0
(72.85)
^Discounted present value calculated using a 7 per cent rate. 
^The grant element as a percent of the total loan is given in
parentheses.
dInternational Cooperation Administration 
^Agency for International Development
Source: Based on John Pincus, Economic Aid and International
Cost Sharing. A Report Prepared for the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security 
Affairs, R-431-ISA (Santa Monica, Ca.: The RAND Cor­
poration, July, 1965), Table 5-2, p. 116.
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The grant element for the recipient is the difference between 
the rate of interest on aid loans and the rate available in the inter­
national market or alternative sources of assistance. It is more dif­
ficult to calculate for the aid recipient due to the difficulty in es­
tablishing appropriate discount rates, appropriate values for tied aid, 
the simplifying assumptions required for calculation of benefits from 
private investment, and the difficulty of determining the inherent ben­
efits from technical assistance and technological transfer incurred in 
assistance programs and private foreign investment.
The fact that a given nominal aid commitment does not have the 
same grant element to the donor and the recipient because of the differ­
ent discount rates prevalent in each country is demonstrated in the 
following example of a 20-year, $1 million loan, granted at 3 per cent 
interest with a 5-year grace period;
1. The grant element to the donor is the nominal value of the 
loan minus the present value of repayments and (a) is zero 
if the discount rate is 3 per cent, and (b) $297,513 if
 ^ _ the discount rate is 6 per cent.
2. The grant element to the recipient is the market rate of
interest minus the rate of interest on the loan and is 
$437,780 if the discount rate is 8 per cent.^^
The grant element for the donor is the result of the difference between 
the market rates of return and the return on the loan committed for
assistance. For the recipient the interest rate on the loan is lower
than the alternative borrowing rate of 8 per cent.
^^Pincus, "Costs and Benefits of Aid," ed- by Meier, Leading 
Issues, p. 264.
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Application of discounted pre­
sent value to aid statistics
The grant element in the foreign aid provided by DAC countries 
for 1962-1966 is determined under two alternative discount rates: (1)
the rate of return on domestic investment, and (2) rate of interest 
paid by the IBRD. The results are summarized in Table 2.
TABLE 2
REAL COST TO DONORS OF AID COMMITMENTS®
Discount Rate 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Donor's domestic 
interest rate 590.0
(21.7)“=
726.0
(25.2)
1050.0
(28.5)
624.3
(20.6)
993.0
(28.1)
IBRD borrowing 
rated ' — 244.8 
( 9.0)
823.7
(11.2)
565.6
(15.4)
304.7
(10.5)
833.4
(25.6)
Nominal value of 
loan commitment 2714.5 2877.2 3681.9 3027.0 3553.9
The grant element is calculated for loan commitments of the 
DAC countries from the donor’s viewpoint.
^The cost of aid to the donor assuming domestic investment is 
the alternative to bilateral lending, is calculated using the long-term 
domestic government bond rate plus 1 per cent as the discount rate.
®The cost of aid to the donor as a percentage of the nominal 
value of the loan is given in parentheses.
^The rate of interest paid by IBRD when borrowing in the mar­
ket is the discount rate used to calculate the cost to the donor of 
providing bilateral loans if the alternative is exclusive reliance on 
multilateral aid channels.
Source: Based on Pincus, "Costs and Benefits of Aid," in
Leading Issues, ed. by Meier, Table 2, p. 263.
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The grant element of loans to thirty-nine recipients is 
determined by the discounted present value technique. As the alterna­
tive source of funds becomes more expensive the grant element increases. 
The results are summarized in Table 3.
TABLE 3 
RECIPIENT'S GRANT ELEMENT^
Year
Nominal Value 
of Borrowing 
($ million)
Grant Element Discounted at
IBRD Borrow­
ing Rate 
(4-5.6 %)
Private For­
eign Lending 
Rate (8%)
Domestic In­
vestment Rate 
(12%)
1960 $ 2278.7 $ 58.6 $ 314.3 $ 710.6
(2.6)b (13.8) (31.2)
1964 3355.0 473.6 1013.2 1592.3
(14.1) (30.2) (47.5)
1965 2665.0 482.7 826.3 1302.1
(18.1) (37.5) (48.9)
The borrowing is for thirty—nine developing countries.
^The grant element as a percentage of the nominal value of 
the loan is in parentheses.
Source: Based on Pincus, "Costs and Benefits of Aid," in
Leading Issues, ed. by Meier, Table 3, p. 266.
As indicated previously, grant element statistics may over­
estimate the sacrifice of the donor and overestimate the value of the 
aid for the recipient because of qualitative features of the aid commit­
ments. An attempt to incorporate these conditions in measuring the 
grant element is made later in the chapter.
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Grant Element In Grants 
and Loans Compared
The grant element In loans and grants is compared by Wilson
Schmidt In a 1964 article, "The Economics of Charity: Loans versus
Grants." The grant element In alternative aid programs Is measured by
the discounted present value method. Contrary to common belief, loans
are not costless to the donor:
The cost to the lender of a loan Is not zero simply because the 
lender receives Interest and repayment. If the funds would pro­
duce a yield in the benefactor nation which Is greater than the 
Interest Income contained by lending the funds abroad, the bene­
factor nation loses real Income through foreign l o a n s . 80
By the same logic, grants are not always more expensive than
loans for the donor:
. . .  grants cost the benefactor less than loans If the yield on 
capital Is higher In the benefactor nation than In the recipient 
nation.01
The cost of the grant element to the donor Is examined under 
two conditions. In case 1, a grant Is cheaper than a loan and In case 2 
a loan Is cheaper than a grant. The outcome depends on the rate of re­
turn prevailing In the donor and recipient countries.
Case 1: Grant cost less 
than a loan
The following assumptions are made:
1- The yield on capital Is 7 per cent In the recipient coun­
try and 8 per cent In the donor country.
2. The length of the loan or annual grant Is 50 years.
p. 388.
^^Schmidt, "The Economics of Charity: Loans versus Grants," 
^^Ibld.. p. 389.
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3. The grant element to the recipient In each alternative Is 
$13.80.
The "real cost" to the donor of the $13.80 transfer is given in Table 4,
TABLE 4
PRESENT COST TO THE DONOR OF ALTERNATIVE 
AID COMMITMENTS— CASE 1
Present Cost
Alternative Programs to Donor
1. Annual grant of $1 $ 12.23
2. Lump sum grant of $13.80 13.80
3. Loan of $14.50 at 0 per cent 13.98
4. Loan of $100 at 6 per cent 24.47
5. Loan of $10 million at 
6.9999 per cent 1.2 million
Source: Wilson E. Schmidt, "The Economics of Charity:
Loans versus Grants," Journal of Political Econ­
omy. LXXII, No. 4 (1964), Table 1, p. 389.
The procedure for determining the $13.80 grant element in each 
of the five cases is as follows:
1. An annual grant of $1 will cost the donor $1 annually for
. 50 years but the present cost, discounted at 8 per cent
over the 50 years is only $12.23.
2. The present cost to the donor of a lump-sum grant of $13.80
is $13.80. The donor loses real Income on $13.80 forever,
which at 8 per cent is $1,104 per year. The present cost 
of such a perpetual loss is $1.104/.08 = $13.80.
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3. A loan of $14.30 at zero rate of Interest will cost the 
donor 8 per cent annually, the discounted value over 50 
years is $13,98.
4. A $100 loan at 6 per cent interest will cost the donor 2 
per cent annually since the yield on capital for the donor 
is 8 per cent. The present value of $2 per annum over 50 
years, discounted at 8 per cent is $24.47.
5. The present cost of a $10 million, 50 year loan, yielding 
6.999 per cent interest will cost a donor country, capable 
of 8 per cent return, a discounted value of $1.2 million. 
The grant element for the recipient is still only $13.80.
It becomes apparent from this study that it is possible to pro­
vide a specified grant element to a recipient ($13.80 in this case) 
through a variety of programs. The size of the grant element depends 
crucially on the comparative rates of return existing in each country 
and the terms of the transfer. The higher the rate of interest on the 
loan, the larger the size of the loan must be to maintain a constant 
yield of $13.80 to the recipient.
Case 2: Loans are cheaper
than grants
The same discounting procedures are applied to determine the 
grant element in the case in which the rate of discount is greater in 
the recipient country (8 %) than the donor (6 %). The grant element 
maintained in each alternative is $12.23. The results are summarized 
in Table 5.
82ibld.. pp. 388-389.
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TABLE 5
PRESENT COST TO THE DONOR OF ALTERNATIVE 
AID COMMITMENTS— CASE 2
Present Cost
Alternative Programs . to Donor
1, Annual grant of $1 $ 15.76
2. Lump-sum grant of $12.23 12.23
3. Loan of $12.50 at 0 per cent 11.82
4. Loan of $33.33 at 5 per cent 5.25
5. Loan of $50 at 6 per cent 0
6. Loan of $100 at 7 per cent - 15.76
Source: Based on Wilson E, Schmidt, "The Economics of
Charity: Loans versus Grants," Journal of Pol- 
tical Economy, LXXII, No. 4 (1964), Table 2, p. 391.
Thus, Schmidt’s theorem is supported:
For a given level of present value of benefit to a recipient, loans 
cost the benefactor less than grants if the yield on capital is 
higher in the recipient nation than in the benefactor nation.
Comprehensive Grant Equivalent Formula
The following formula developed by Janos Horvath^^ deserves 
a special place in aid literature defining and measuring the grant 
element. Many concessionary factors heretofore noted are now incor­
porated into the comprehensive grant equivalent formula.
^^Ibid.. p. 390.
^^Horvath, "Foreign Economic Aid in the International Encyclc— 
pedla of the Social Sciences: A Review Article." p. 438.
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The grant element is found by multiplying the aid program by 
the comprehensive grant ratio. The comprehensive grant ratio incor­
porates the "concession factors" which determine the degree of con­
cession in a flow of resources. The following formula shows explicitly 
the relationship of the factors to the comprehensive grant ratio.
g = [ 1 - À -tc i ] X [ 1 - + g + g + g + g^
g IT - W  1 z J
where:
g = the comprehensive g^  ^= grant element of aid tying
grant ratio
g^ = grant element of repayment 
Â = Interest rate charges currency provisions
q = comparative rate of g^ = grant element of surplus goods
discount (opportunity
cost) 3 ,  = grant element of change in
terms of trade
T = time of maturity in years
M = moratorium on repayment, 6 = base of natural logarithm,
i.e. the grace period 2.718
This technique fills a gap in foreign aid measurement.
The Effect of Tied Aid on the Grant Element 
The practice of tying aid, which is becoming increasingly the 
rule rather than the exception, reduces the value of the aid to the 
recipient.®^ Many costs are involved with tied aid, all of which
G^Ibid.
^^Pincus, "The Cost of Foreign Aid," p. 363. Also, Meier, 
"Foreign Aid: Economic Aspects," p. 528; Hawkins, Principles of Foreign 
Aid, pp. 28-29, 40, 124; W, Whitney Hicks, "Estimating the Foreign Ex­
change Costs of United Aid," The Southern Economic Journal, XXX, No. 1 
(July, 1963), 168-174; Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, p. 252-
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reduce the grant element. The most obvious cost is the price differ­
ential on tied-aid exports• Several studies have been conducted to 
measure this excess cost and reduction in aid value. These studies 
and the methodologies used are examined.
Excess Costs Due to Price Differentials 
Â direct cost of tied aid is the excess cost due to the price 
paid by the recipient country exceeding the lowest delivered price 
available on the world market. These price differentials are due to 
several factors:
1. Explicit collusion by suppliers in the donor country.
2. The f.o.b. price, which is equivalent to the donor's
domestic price, is charged.
Suppliers often set the export price less than the domestic
price since the foreign market is considered more competitive than the
domestic market. However, when donor suppliers treat aid—financed
exports as an extension of the domestic market and charge the domestic
price, the aid recipient is overcharged relative to the world market 
87price.
^^Alan Carlin, Project versus Program Aid: From the Donor's 
Viewpoint, P-3283 (Santa Monica, Calif: The RAND Corporation), December, 
1965. Also, H. W. Singer; "External Aid: For Plans or Projects?", Econ­
omic Journals LXXV, No. 299 (September, 1965), 539-545; Jagdish N, 
Bhagwati, The Tying of Aid. Growth, Development Aid and Finance (Syn­
chronization of International and National Policies). United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, Second Session, (TD/7/Supp. 4), 
February 1, 1968, pp. 23-30.
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Excess costs of tied aid due to price differentials can be 
measured by comparing. Item by Item, the prices quoted by the donor 
country to world market prices. This type of data Is difficult to 
obtain and suffers many limitations:
1. Numerous cases would need to be examined In order to gen­
eralize from specific cases to conclusions.
2. Estimates are based on a relatively small sample of tied 
purchases and the results may not be typical.
3. Direct costs can only be estimated reliably when Inter­
national tenders have been Invited or when standard price 
lists exist.
One study based on a comparison of Internationally bid prices 
and tied aid prices was conducted by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the results arc summarized In Table
6. The spread of bids on International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA) 
credits from the highest to the successful bid was used to measure the 
potential excess cost of aid-tying. The formula for measuring the per­
centage of potential excess cost is: (High Bids - Successful Bids) / 
Successful Bids.
The results In Table 6 Indicate that the percentage of poten­
tial excess cost averaged 49.3 per cent. Over 31 per cent of the value
^^United Nations, Conference on Trade and Development, Second 
Session, The Costs of Aid—Tying to Recipient Countries. Progress 
Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat. Growth. Development Finance and Aid 
(Synchronization of International and National Policies), (TD/7/Supp.8) 
February 15, 1968, pp. 1, 7, 9. Also, Bhagwati, The Tying of Aid, 
p. 33.
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of contracts awarded Involved a potential excess cost of over 30 per 
cent. Sixty-three per cent of the value of contracts awarded Involved 
a potential excess cost of over 30 per cent.
TABLE 6
POTENTIAL EXCESS COST OF AID-TYING*
Range
Number of 
Contracts
Percentage of 
Contracts
Percentage Value of Con­
tracts to total value
Less than 10 % 12 13.0 17.6
10 - 20 % 8 8.7 5.4
20 - 30 % 13 14.1 14.1
30 - 40 % 12 13.0 13.0
40 - 50 % 9 9.8 18.6
50 - 100 % 27 29.4 28.0
100 % and over 11 12.0 3.3
Total 92 100.0 100.0
^ h e  potential excess cost was determined by the ratios of the 
difference between the high bids and successful bids to the successful 
bids In competitive bidding on twenty IBRD loans and three IDA credits 
for 1960 to 1966.
Source: Jagdish N. Bhagwati, The Tying of Aid. Growth, Dev-
1. elopment Aid and Finance (Synchronization of Interna­
tional Policies). United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, Second Session (TD/7/Supp.4), Feb­
ruary 1, 1968, Table 4, p. 35.
This procedure may over- or under-state the costs. The actual 
costs of aid-tying may be overstated if:
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1. The products are not standardized. The price differential
may indicate differences in clauses and conditions of the
sale, quality differences, and different specifications of 
the contract.
2. The donor offers a lower cost than the highest IBRD bid.
The spread between the highest and lowest bid then over-
89states the cost.
The actual costs may be understated if:
1. The donor is higher than the highest IBRD bid and did not 
bid on the contract, precluding it from the study.
2. The full range of prices are not made known since potential 
suppliers have little incentive to bid on contracts fin­
anced through tied aid.
Country studies— estimates 
of excess costs of tied aid
A study of the excess cost of imports financed through tied aid
was conducted by the UN for four countries— Chile, Iran, Tunisia, and
Pakistan.
89Bhagwati, The Tying of Aid, pp. 33-35. Also, United Nations, 
The Costs of Aid-Tying to Recipient Countries, pp. 7-9.
*°Ibid.
91The policy of aid-tying was officially embraced and inter­
nationally practiced beginning in the early I960*s. By the late 1960*s 
the recipients began experiencing the severity of the excess cost and 
UN studies were conducted to measure the reduction in grant element. 
Since that time, the excess cost of tied aid has become an accepted 
condition and very little attention has been given to incorporating 
the qualitative features of aid-tying into grant element calculations.
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Chile
A sample of 51 tied credits was reviewed but international
bids were obtained for only 16 of the credits. The excess cost was
estimated by the formula: (A — B) / B where A is the price actually
paid to the U.S. supplier (f.o.b.) and B Is the lowest International
bid (f.o.b,)^^. The total tied-ald flow amounted to $30,5 million, 10
per cent of Chile's total official and multilateral assistance for
the period 1964-1967. The 16 credits for which international bids
were obtained amounted to about $180,000, less than 1 per cent of the
93total amount of credits in the sample. The average percentage of 
excess cost on the 16 purchases was 12.4 per cent. See Table 7.
Consistent with the theory that international bids on items 
financed by tied aid are offered on only small items, the price of 
most of the 16 items ranged from $5,000 to $20,000. The cost of pre­
paring bids is high and when aid recipients have limited flexibility
In purchasing, international bids are not forthcoming on large pur-
94chases where the chance of obtaining the contract is not high. The 
average percentage of excess cost is lower on small purchases than on 
large procurements because:
1. Lack of international competition on larger purchases 
lead to excess costs.
92United Nations, Conference on Trade and Development, "Sum­
mary and Evaluation of Data Relating to the Utilization of Tied Cre­
dits to Chile," (TD/7/Supp- 8/Add. 1) cited in United Nations Confer­
ence on Trade and Development, The Costs of Aid-Tying to Recipient 
Countries. pp. 8-10.
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TABLE 7
CHILE'S IMPORTS FROM THE US 
FINANCED BY TIED AID^
Lowest International
bid (f.o.b.) . Price Actually 
Paid to U. .S.. 
Supplier (f.oh.)
Excès:
Cost'Item Imported Country Amount
Reclosers Japan 2,170 5,775 166 :
Disc insulators Japan 6,093 8,425 38
Steel cables Switzerland 7,005 7,205 3
Cables
Cables and Con—
Belgium 9,114 9,490 4
ectors France 15,785 17,241 9
Rotary compressor UK 24,142 29,759 23
Light truck UK 8,456 10,367 23
Motors Netherlands 8,799 9,888 12
Power grader 
Spare grinding
FR Germany 17,475 19,360 11
wheels USA 1,795 1,795 — —
Insulating oil UK 4,980 5,378 8
Tractors UK 10,760 10,915 1
Mercury vapour 
Telegraphic com­
Switzerland 2,598 2,687 3
ponents 
Spare parts for
Switzerland 2,746 2,779 1
locomotives FR Germany 23,780 24,973 5
Tractors UK 33,900 35,924 6
Average 11,224 12,622 12.4
®For 1964-1967, in U.S. dollars, 
invited and received on these items.
International tenders were
Excess cost was computed as a percent of the lowest inter­
national bid;(US price - lowest bid) X 100.
Source: Based on United Nations, Conference on Trade and
Development, Second Session, The Costs of Aid-Tying 
to Recipient Countries. Progress Report by the UNCTAD 
Secretariat. Growth, Development Finance and Aid 
(Synchronization of International and National Pol­
icies) , (TD/7/Supp. 8) February 15, 1968, Table 1,
p. 8.
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2. Lack of international competition leads to the establish­
ment of higher prices in the tied-sources country.
3. Switching by the aid recipient is more limited on large 
purchases. The recipient has less flexibility in rear­
ranging its imports* especially if the donor is a primary 
source of aid financing.
Due to these factors the study suggests•that the 12.4 per cent
is an underestimation of the average percentage of excess direct costs 
95of aid-tying.
Iran^®
The estimate of excess costs to Iran due to price differentials 
on tied aid is based on 6 projects, accounting for $9 million and 20 
per cent of total procurements under tied aid for the year 1966-1967. 
During this time period the total inflow of tied-aid capital amounted 
to $56.7 million with $49 million representing actual disbursements on 
goods and services in connection with 15 development projects. The 
excess cost for the 6 projects was estimated to be $1.4 million, 15 
per cent of the total amount spent on the 6 projects.
Tunisia
An estimate of the excess cost of tied aid to Tunisia due to 
price differentials was made for 1965 based on $17 million of U.S.
^^Ibid,. pp. 4-5, 9-10.
^^Eprime Eshag, "Study on the Excess Cost of Tied Economic Aid 
Given to Iran in 1966/67," (TD/7/Supp. 8/Add, 2), cited in United Na­
tions Conference on Trade and Development, The Costs of Aid-Tying to 
Recipient Countries, pp. 11-12.
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development aid, accounting for over 20 per cent of the tied aid re­
ceived by Tunisia in 1965. Tunisia received a gross inflow of dev­
elopment capital of $133 million in 1965. Of this figure, $74,5 mil­
lion was official source-tied aid, $41 million representing goods and 
technical assistance services subject to direct tying. The U.S. ac­
counted for over 60 per cent of the official source-tied aid. The
study limited its estimates to the disbursements made under U.S. com-
97modity-loan agreements and under certain project development loans.
The method of estimating the excess cost is based on equaliza­
tion. The value of goods imported under AID loans, c.i.f. (cost, insur­
ance, freight), is compared with the price charged to local merchants 
by the government of Tunisia. The process of equalization enables the 
merchant handling the AID—financed imports to earn a reasonable profit 
on those goods in which U.S. prices are considerably higher than the 
prices of the alternative sources of supply. The reliability of equali­
zation as an indicator of the excess cost of tying depends on the cor­
respondence between internal prices and world prices. In the case of 
Tunisia, the internal prices were influenced by domestic policies of 
taxation and tariffs such that the equalization method underestimated 
the excess costs of tying. Using estimated equalization as an indica­
tor of excess cost, 18 per cent of the c.i.f. value of imports under 
commodity—loan agreements tied to the U.S. source was excess cost.
97Eprime Eshag, "Report on Tied Economic Aid Given to Tunisia 
in 1965," (TD/7/Supp. 8/Add. 3), cited in United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, The Costs of Aid—Tying to Recipient Countries, 
pp. 13-14.
®®Ib±d.
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Pakistan
Hahbub ul Haq estimated the excess costs of tied aid for Pak­
istan for the years 1960-1963 based on a sample of 20 development pro­
jects . .by comparing the lowest bid from the tied source with the 
lowest international bid.** Using this methodology rather than the actu­
al price paid, the conclusion reached was that the weighted average 
price was **. . • *51 per cent higher from the tied source compared to 
the international bids, * This methodology reveals '*. . - an esti­
mate of the range of cost which can be incurred owing to the tying of 
aid, rather than an estimate of actual cost incurred, **^ ^^
Excess Costs Due to Contributions-in-Kind
The grant element is difficult to calculate for contributions- 
in-kind (primarily the sale of surplus commodities), one category of 
tied aid. The problem is in determining the correct price to place on 
these contributions. Some possible prices are: (1) the world market 
price, (2) the opportunity cost of the factors of production, (3) the 
recipient *s domestic price, and (4) the market-clearing price.
The grant element of commodities shipped under PL 480 was cal­
culated by John Pincus, using three methods. The Title I shipments were 
defined as 80 per cent grant and 20 per cent loan. The shipments were
Mahbub ul Haq, *'Tied Credits: A Quantitative Analysis,'* a 
paper submitted to International Economic Association Round Table Con­
ference on Capital Movements and Economic Development, Washington, D.C., 
July 1965, cited in United Mations Conference on Trade and Development, 
The Costs of Aid-Tying to Recipient Countries, p. 14.
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valued at world market prices. At the time of Pincus's study. Title I 
shipments were sold for local currency with a portion of the revenue 
earmarked for U.S. use in the country and the remainder either granted 
or loaned to the host government for economic development purposes.
The proceeds reserved for U.S. use are not included in Pincus's study 
as aid. The loans are basically grants since the repayments cannot 
be used by the U.S. to buy other currencies or to import the recip­
ient's products. The Title II and III shipments are valued by the U.S. 
in reporting PL 480 contributions to DAC at Commodity Credit Corpora­
tion (CCC) cost. The over-evaluation of aid is apparent in that the 
1961 world price of wheat was approximately $60 per metric ton, while 
Title II exports of wheat were valued at approximately $150 per metric 
ton,^^^ The affect of PL 480 calculations on the value of U.S. aid is 
given in Table 8, the only difference in the nominal aid value being 
the method of valuing the U.S. PL 480 contributions.
Method A. This method is used in reporting PL 480 contri­
butions to DAC. Title I proceeds are included as aid when the deposit 
is made in the U.S. counterpart account. Title IX and III commitments 
are valued at CCC cost, which is above world market prices.
Method B. All 1961 PL 480 shipments were valued at world 
market prices regardless of whether the counterpart funds were deposited.
Method C. The price is established by estimating the market 
clearing prices, using the estimated elasticity of demand and assuming
^^^Pincus, "The Cost of Foreign Aid," pp. 366-367, Also,
Pincus, Economic Aid and Cost Sharing, pp. 144-145.
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the PL 480 shipments are sold in the world markets. The decrease in 
the nominal aid value is the result of the difference between actual 
1961 world prices and those that would have prevailed had the commodi­
ties been sold on world markets.
TABLE 8
U.S. BILATERAL AID COMMITMENTS^
Nominal
Nominal
Value
Aid Value Discounted at
Method
Aid
Value
as % of 
GNP 5 5.75 10 7 ^
Method A 4456 0.86 2867 2966 3385
Method B 3979 0-76 2431 2527 2924
Method C 3616 0.67 2114 2208 2596
a.in $ millions» for 1961. 
^Domestic Opportunity Cost 
^IBRD lending rate
Private investment rate of return
Source: John A. Pincus, "The Cost of Foreign Aid," Review of
Economics and Statistics, XLV, No. 1 (February, 1963), 
based on Table. 3, p. 363.
This method of computing market-clearing prices is applied to 
1961 PL 480 shipments and the results are summarized in Table 9. Using 
the assumed demand elasticity for each commodity, the price at which 
all goods could have been sold is designated as the "market-clearing 
price." For example, assuming a demand elasticity of - 0.7 for Wheat 
and Flour A for 1961 the shipment of 10,942,000 metric tons would have
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cleared the market at $42.86 per metric ton for a value of $469 mil­
lion. The export price at which the shipments were valued for DAC 
purposes was $60.41 for a total value of $661 million. The difference 
of $192 million can be considered as excess valuation of aid.
If the market—clearing value of "Wheat and Flour B" is estab­
lished at $1.36 per bushel as the minimum export price and the total 
value set at $729 million, only 53 per cent of 1961 PL 480 wheat ship­
ments could have been sold on the world market at the assumed demand 
elasticities. At lower prices, wheat would have competed with feed-
grains and demand would have been much more elastic. The rest of the 
103wheat is valued at zero.
TABLE 9
PUBLIC LAW 480 SHIPMENTS VALUED AT 1961 WORLD-MARKET 
PRICES AND AT ESTIMATED MARKET-CLEARING PRICES
Market- Market- Export Export Assumed
Shipments clearing clearing Price Value Demand
(000 met­ Price ($ Value ($ ($ per 1961 Elastic­
Commodity ric tons) per m.tn. million) m. ton) Price ity
Wheat and
Flour A 10,942 42.86 469.0 60.41 661.0 - 0.7
Wheat and
Flour B 10,942 50.000 290.0 --  350.4
Barley 319 45.40 14.5 47.18 15.1 - 1.3
Corn 1,362 44.74 60.9 48.61 66.2 - 1.3
Dried Milk 276 121.74 33.7 155.52 43.1 - 1.0
Cotton 239 613.09 140.7 624.90 149.5 - 3.3
Source : Based on John A. Pincus, Economic Aid and Interna-
tional Cost Sharing. A Report Prepared for the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International
Security Affairs , R-431-ISA (Santa Monica, Ca.: The
RAND Corporation, July, 1965), Table 5-16, p. 145.
57
Suirtmary
The amount of dollars in the figure "Flow of Resources to 
Developing Countries" is often mistakenly assumed to be aid, commonly 
referred to as "give-aways," The dollars.which Congress appropriates 
in Foreign Economic Assistance acts are most certainly considered as 
aid. The grant figures are rarely questioned as being a complete loss 
to the U.S. economy. However, all of these over-state the amount of 
"gift," i.e. unilateral transfer of resources, and the cost of the pro­
gram to the U.S. economy and taxpayer. The purpose of this chapter 
has been to redefine aid in such a manner that costless transfers from 
the developed to the developing countries can be identified easily and 
to examine the methods of measuring the various components of the 
resource flows.
The motives for which assistance is provided and the objectives 
which assistance is expected to accomplish often deviate considerably 
from the objective of development of a recipient’s economy. Addition­
ally, about half of the resource flows are through private market 
channels with the explicit purpose of profit maximization for the in­
vestor. No justification can be made for including this in the aid 
figure. The true "aid" is the grant element which is a unilateral 
transfer of resources from one country to another. The problem then 
is to extract the grant element from the flow of total resource figure.
The discounted present value technique can be applied to 
assistance programs to determine the value, incorporating the terms 
of the commitment and the alternative costs to both donor and recipient. 
This method can be used to compare resource transfers through loans and
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grants. There are cases in which it is less costly for a donor to pro­
vide a given grant element through a grant rather than a loan.
The most difficult aspect of an aid commitment to measure is 
the specification that the funds must be spent on particular items in 
the donor country. It is not essential that the grant element be re­
duced because of this stipvlation. However, statistics show that the 
grant element is reduced by 20 per cent due to excess price of tied- 
aid financing.
Only the grant element in resource flows should be identified 
as aid, the flows having been discounted according to the appropriate 
discount rate and the commitment adjusted for specific qualifications, 
such as aid-tying.
CHAPTER IV
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS EFFECT OF TIED AID 
Introduction
The purpose of the chapter is to examine the balance of pay­
ments effect of tying and untying aid. Theoretical analysis of tied 
aid is relatively neglected in the literature. For example, the cost- 
benefit analysis of aid often does not take into account the tied aid 
factor:
In view of the difficulty of measuring the appropriate discount 
for tied contributions (theoretically it is the difference be­
tween the price charged for tied goods and their world market 
price),I have not tried, in these computations, to apply a dis­
count .
Another important theoretical work in assessing the value of
aid neglects the tied aid factor:
Important considerations concerning the costs and effectiveness of 
tying arrangements have not been discussed in this paper. Such 
considerations include the fungibility of foreign exchange, which 
may permit aid-receiving countries to shift normal imports to an 
aid basis and free the proceeds of normal exports for untied spend­
ing; the discriminatory effect of tying as measured by price differ­
entials; whether as a matter of policy tying is to be eschewed be­
cause it reduces the value to underdeveloped countries of a given 
amount of aid, or embraced because it permits a higher volume of
^^^Pincus, "The Cost of Foreign Aid," p. 363.
59
60
aid with a given balance of payments deficit or a lower deficit 
with a given amount of aid.
The importance of the tied aid factor is recognized, yet is neglected 
even though 80 per cent of U.S. bilateral aid is tied.
The theoretical aspect of the tied aid policy on the donor's 
balance of payments is examined. The short-run impact depends on the 
recipient's ability to use aid funds to finance imports normally pur­
chased with free foreign exchange. The additionality factor attempts 
to measure this short-run impact. The long-run effect of aid tying or 
untying is the result of respending of aid funds through normal trade 
channels. This is measured by the reflection—ratio, the reserve— 
accumulation, and the generalized multisector multiplier models.
History of Aid Tying 
The U.S. became committed to a policy of aid tying in 1959 due 
to increasing concern over the U.S. balance of payments problem. At 
that time, 58 per cent of aid was untied and bids were received on a 
world-wide basis. The aid-tying policies set down to increase U.S. 
exports came from several directions: (1) the U.S. Treasury issued a 
"Buy American" policy for the Development Loan Fund (DLF)^^^, (2) Pre­
sident Eisenhower re-emphasized the policy in 1960,^^^ (3) the Director
^^^Hicks, "Estimating the Foreign Exchange Costs of Untied 
Aid," pp. 173-174.
R. Danielian, The U.S. Balance of Payments (Washington, 
D.C.: International Economic Policy Association, 1966), p. 4.
*^^ ^Ibid., citing "Directive by the President Concerning Steps 
to be Taken with Respect to the U.S. Balance, of Payments," White House 
Press Release, November 17, 1960.
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of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) vas instructed 
to effect an orderly cessation of commodity procurement financed with 
ICA program funds from nineteen reserve accumulating countries.
These policies of aid tying were given vide Congressional ap­
proval by the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Section 
604 states the intent of reducing the impact of aid activities on the 
balance of payments:
Funds made available under this Act may be used for procurement out­
size the U.S. only if the President determines that such procure­
ment will not result in adverse effects upon the economy of the U.S. 
or the industrial mobilization base, with special reference to any 
areas of labor surplus or to the net position of the U.S. in its 
balance of payments with the rest of the world, which outweighs 
the economic or other advantages to the U.S. of less costly pro­
curement outside the U.S.^^^
This was the beginning of tremendous pressure on export pro­
motion. In a 1961 balance of payments message. President Kennedy 
stated: **In seeking overall equilibrium, we must place maximum emphasis 
on expanding our e x p o r t s . T h e  Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was 
another attempt to open new markets and widen existing markets for 
American exports.
^^^Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ger­
many, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., Hong Kong,
109Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Section 604.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, 
Balance of Payments— 1965, before a subcommittee of the Committee on 
Banking and Currency, Senate, 89th Congress, 1st Session, Part I, 1965, 
p. 623, quoted in Danielian, The U.S. Balance of Payments, p. 97.
^^^Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
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In spite of export promotion efforts and increased aid-tying, 
concern regarding the mounting balance-of-payments problem is recorded 
in periodic Presidential messages and directives to cut the overseas 
dollar cost of aid. Although a long lead-time usually exists before
a change in policy is reflected in expenditure figures due to pre-tied 
obligations, the technique of tying economic assistance to U.S. pro­
curement did curtail the direct adverse impact according to the Agency 
for International Development (AID) Administrator, Mr. David Bell. U.S.
procurement of goods financed with aid funds increased from 42 per cent
n
in 1960 to 80 per cent in 1964.
Aid-Tying Motives
The most common motives for tying aid are:
1. To minimize the foreign exchange cost of aid and reduce 
the adverse balance—of—payments effect.
2. To strengthen commercial ties, influence trade patterns, 
and promote domestic exports.
3. To support domestic programs, especially in the case of 
PL 480.
4. To advance political considerations.
112Danielian, The U.S. Balance of Payments, pp. 4-5. 
p. 97.
^^^Bhagwati, Growth. Development Aid and Finance: The Tying of 
Aid, pp. 17-19. Also, Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, pp. 184- 
193, 246-254; Hicks, "Estimating the Foreign Exchange Costs of Untied 
Aid," pp. 168, 173; Alan Carlin, Project Versus Program Aid; From the 
Donor's Viewpoint, Rand Project No. 3283 (Santa Monica, Ca.: The RAND 
Corporation, 1965), pp. 4-9; V. N. Bandera, "Tied Loans and Interna­
tional Payments Problems," Oxford Economic Papers, XVII, No. 2 (July,
1965), pp. 299-300; Hawkins, The Principles of Development Aid, pp. 18, 
29, 97.
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To what extent aid tying achieved the original objective of 
relieving balance of payments pressure is estimated in this chapter. 
Measurement is difficult due to:
1. Fungibility or "switching" in which the recipient uses 
the aid funds to finance imports previously imported with 
free exchange.
2. The respending effect in which third country trading part­
ners of aid recipients increase imports from the U.S.
3. The competitive reciprocal aid-tying by other donor
115countries.
Aid-Tying Arrangements
Aid may be tied through a variety of arrangements. The most 
common form is bilateral aid to finance a specific project or a develop­
ment program. Export credits and FL 480 financing are definitely tied, 
the only question being how much of the credit is "aid.”^^^
Project aid is given to finance the foreign exchange component 
of a specific project. The cost to the recipient is the loss of bar­
gaining power and control over economic and political policies. Cap­
ital expenditures are favored over import maintenance due to the donor's 
eagerness to capitalize on the "billboard" effect of aid. An indirect 
benefit of project aid which the recipient may enjoy is an increase in
Bhagwati, The Tying of Aid, pp. 37-47.
^^^Lester B. Pearson, Partners in Development, Report of the 
Commission on International Development (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1969), pp. 118-121, 176-179. Also, Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign 
Aid, pp. 254-255; Hawkins, Principles of Development Aid, pp. 122-125.
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117absorptive capacity brought on by the process of project preparation.
In contrast, the total needs and the development plan of the 
recipient are considered when program aid is provided. Specific items 
are not designated for purchase and the donor is not involved in de­
tailed use of the funds. Aid tying is not as successful in this case.^^^
The issues in the project or program approach to economic 
assistance are fungibility, local currency financing, and determlna2^%n 
of high priority projects. Although tying of aid through projects in­
sures that particular goods will be exported, the project which is 
really financed may not use the goods supplied by the donor due to fun­
gibility. The aid funds may release the recipient’s funds to finance 
projects not approved by the donor. The effect of tying can also be 
minimized by the recipient by identifying goods normally imported with 
free foreign exchange as project related.
Secondly, most project aid funds are purely foreign exchange 
aid. Local currency needs must be provided by the recipient and may be 
withdrawn from projects which the recipient regards as high priority.
Thirdly, the scope of program aid is the entire development
plan of the recipient and the interrelationship of policies whereas
119project aid is a series of isolated efforts.
In spite of recommendations by such authorities as the Pearson 
Commission for more program aid to increase its effectiveness, project
W- Singer, "External Aid: For Plans or Projects?", Econ­
omic Journal, LXXV, No. 299 (September, 1965), pp. 539-545. Also,
Carlin, "Project Versus Program Aid," pp. 1-15.
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aid still receives support from Congress and from those who Identify 
project aid with traditional banking guidelines. The basic question 
Is— What Is the objective of aid? The form of assistance Is determined 
by the donor and It is the donor's objective that dominates the decis— 
l o n . 1 2 0
Theoretical Analysis of the Balance-of—Payments 
Effect of Tied Aid
Introduction
Although the policy of tying was Instituted in response to the
seriousness of the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit, it Is not a "cure-
all" for balance-of-payments problems. In fact, the U.S. balance-of-
payments deficit Is the result of the triangular nature of transactions
with the developing countries according to some authorities:
Actually, the main source of the persistent payments surplus of 
continental Europe, which is the counterpart of our payments defi­
cit, are not the direct transactions between the U.S. and Europe—  
but indirect transactions. Continental Europe has a huge export 
surplus in relation to the less developed nations, which is being 
financed largely by the public and private funds that the U.S. 
pours into those countries. Hence, a curtailment of the contin­
uous increase in the flow of U.S. funds to less developed countries 
is needed for a correction both of our own payments deficit and of 
the continental European s u r p l u s . ^^^1
The balance-of-payments effect of aid can be separated into 
two distinct parts: (1) the Initial change in exports and (2) subse­
quent, induced changes in exports, i.e. the responding effect. The 
questions are:
^^^Singer, "External Aid: For Plans of Projects?", pp. 540-544. 
Also, Carlin, "Project Versus Program Aid", p. 2.
^^^anielian. The U.S. Balance of Payments, p. 98, quoting a 
speech given by Governor J. L. Robertson of the Federal Reserve Board 
In a Conference of New Reserve Bank Directors, Washington, D.C., March 
25, 1965.
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1. What share of the tied aid returns to the U.S. in the
form of additional exports?
2. What is the respending effect as countries adjust their
spending patterns to first-round balance-of-payments gains
and losses if aid is untied?
3. What share of aid can the U.S. expect to get back, immedi­
ately and in the long run, in the form of additional ex­
ports if aid is untied?
Substitution and Additionality
The first and third questions refer to the use of aid funds to
purchase items normally purchased with free foreign exchange— the short-
run situation of "substitution” or "switching." The donor's ability 
to correct a balance-of—payments deficit through tying depends on the 
effectiveness of the tying restrictions. Successful tying means an 
increase in the donor's exports equal to the amount of tied aid.
Even as early as the Brookings Institute Study in 1963 it 
was recognized that aid-financed exports may not represent a net addi­
tion to exports. However, at that time no model had been developed to 
measure the extent of switching so the study "guessed" the proportion 
of aid funds substituting for free foreign exchange. The funds re­
leased by substitution were assumed to be spent as ordinary export 
earnings. The Brookings Study estimated that 47 per cent of AID econ­
omic aid expenditures in 1961 leaked into Western European reserves. 
However, this estimate is difficult to evaluate since a great deal of 
the analytical and empirical evidence necessary to support the
67
assumptions used in the study were not available at the time and were 
therefore unscientifically "guessed."
The determination of the "additionality" factor is considered 
by the authors of the Rand studies to be one of the major contribu­
tions of their studies. The idea of additionality is to identify those 
U.S. exports which would not have been purchased in the absence of assis­
tance. Cooper defines additionality as the ratio of the flow of addi-
124tional exports to the flow of development lending. It is in the
determination of the additionality factor that the authors of the Rand
studies consider other studies have made the greatest error in calculat-
125ing balance-of—payments costs of aid.
Long-Run, Respending Effect 
Question two and three refer to the "feedback" or responding of 
aid funds through normal trade channels. The long-run changes in world
^^^Walter S. Salant, et al., The United States Balance of Pay­
ments in 1968 (Washington, D.C.; The Brookings Institution, 1963), pp. 
170-174.
Richard V. L. Cooper, The Additionality Factor in Tied U.S. 
Development Assistance, A Report Prepared for the Agency for Interna­
tional Development, R-974 (Santa Monica, Ca.: The RAND Corporation,.
July, 1972).Also, David S. C. Chu and Robert Shishko, The Respending 
Effects of Untying Aid, A Report Prepared for Agency for International 
Development, R-975-AID (Santa Monica, Ca,: The RAND Corporation, June, 
1972); Robert Slighton, et al., The Effect of Untied Development Loans 
on the U.S. Balance of Payments, A Report Prepared for Agency for Inter­
national Development, R-973-AID (Santa Monica, Ca.: The RAND Corpora­
tion, June, 1972).
^^^Cooper, The Additionality Factor, pp. v, 2.
Ibid., pp. 3, 6. Also, Slighton, The Effect of Untied Dev­
elopment Loans, pp. 36-39.
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trade often reverse the short-run, balance-of-payments loss from unty­
ing aid or leakages of tied aid funds through substitution. The studies 
surveyed concluded that the first-round loss of U.S. exports over-esti­
mate the total change in U.S. exports and balance-of-payments effect 
of aid.^^®
127Reflection-ratio model
The basic assumption is that the demand for imports is a 
direct function of exports. This is given without any provision for 
reserve-accumulation behavior: M — Æ -f aX  where M is imports, X is ex­
ports and /t is the reflection ratio. It is accepted in economic lit­
erature that a change in exports affects income and thus imports. How­
ever, since exports are not the only autonomous element of income the 
model is criticized by the authors of the Rand studies as being mis— 
specified and leading to inefficient estimates of the true parameters.
Reserve-accumulation model^^^
The assumption that distinguishes the reserve-accumulation
^^^Salant, Balance of Payments in 1968, p. 161. Also, Sligh­
ton, The Effect of Untied Development Loans, pp. viii, 72, 80, 92; Chu 
and Shishko, The Respending Effects, p. 47; Hicks, "Estimating the For- 
eighn Exchange Costs of Untied Aid,", p. 168.
Rolf Piekarz and Lois E. Stekler, "Induced Changes in Trade 
and Payments," Review of Economics and Statistics. XLIX (November, 1967), 
517-526. Also, W. Beckerman, "The World Trade Multiplier and the Sta­
bility of World Trade, 1938 to 1953," Econometrica» XXIV (July, 1956), 
239-252.
^^^Chu and Shishko, The Responding Effects, p. 3-
^^^Hicks, "Estimating the Foreign Exchange Costs," pp. 168-174; 
Salant, Balance of Payments in 1968; Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., "An Empiri­
cal Analysis of U.S. Foreign Economic Aid and the U.S. Balance of Pay­
ments, 1954-1963," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University,
1966), p. 35.
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model from the reflection-ratio model is that governments hold foreign 
exchange in proportion to their trade volume. As exports increase re­
serves increase. Funds not retained are respent on additional imports. 
An extreme form of the model assumes that developed countries retain as 
reserves all the foreign exchange generated by an increase in exports, 
and the developing countries retain none.^^^
The reserve-accumulation models of Hicks, Rhomberg and Boisson-
neault, and the Brookings Institute Study make the assumption that
the Western European countries, including the U.K., add the increased
foreign exchange earnings to reserves and do not allocate incremental
foreign exchange earnings according to observed trade patterns. Hence,
the total volume of aid-induced U.S. exports estimated will be less ••
than the amount of the initial aid expenditures. The stronger the aid
recipient's trade ties with Europe, the weaker the export-generating 
132effect of U.S. aid.
Lynn used the reflection ratio technique, assuming alternative 
reserve accumulating behavior of third countries, to estimate the third 
country impact of aid expenditures on U.S. exports. The Hicks technique 
is modified by allowing for the possibility that U.S. economic aid is
^^^Chu and Shishko, The Respending Effects, p. 2.
^^^Rudolph Rhomberg and Lourette Boissonneault, "Income and 
Price Effects on the U.S. Balance of Payments," IMF Staff Papers, XI 
(July, 1964), pp. 59-124.
^^^Lynn, "An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Foreign Economic Aid 
and the U.S. Balance of Payments, 1954-1963," p. 35.
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not allocated by the recipients in the same proportions as the overall
U.S. share of the recipient’s markets. This allows the technique to
133be applied to tied, as well as untied, aid.
Multisector multiplier model
According to the Hand studies, the long-run impact of untying
results from increases in the demand for U.S. exports induced by the
increases in income in those countries enjoying a first-round increase
in e x p o r t s . T h e  major weakness, as seen by the Rand writers, common
to both the reserve-accumulation and reflection-ratio models is that
neither correctly links changes in exports to changes in income and
135thus to changes in imports. The Rand studies do not use the reflec­
tion ratio but use a multisector multiplier model which makes this link 
and presents a multiregional model of world income and trade.
Specific Studies Measuring the Balance-of-
Payments Effect of Aid
The following studies demonstrate the three techniques for 
measuring the short-run and long-run effects of aid and aid—tying on 
the balance of payments. The theoretical models are described and a 
critical analysis of the results, with policy implications, is presented.
, pp. 34-36.
Slighton, The Effect of Untied Development Loans, pp. 72-85. 
Chu and Shishko, The Respending Effects, p. 3.
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Reflection-Ratio Technique of Hicks 
A country's reflection ratio is found by the formula: 
d f A ^ /  where dM^ is the change in the recipient's imports from the 
donor and is the total change in the aid recipient's imports. The
long-run effect of an aid dollar is found by tracing the funds through 
rounds of spending by the formula: R /R where R R^^ is the aid 
recipient's reflection ratio vis-a-vis third country and R R^ ^  is the 
third country's reflection ratio vis-a—vis the aid donor. If the aid 
recipient spends the funds in another country, the third country's 
imports from the U.S. will be increased by some p o r t i o n . F o r  ex­
ample, assume Country B receives $1 in U.S. aid and spends the funds 
according to the assumed trade matrix of Table 10. Country B will 
spend $0.70 in Country A, $0.20 in Country C and $0.10 in the U.S. 
Country C will then spend half of the $0.20 in the U.S., $0.08 in B, 
and $0.02 in A, which does not trade with the U.S. After four rounds 
of spending by Countries B and C, U.S. exports will have increased by 
$0.22. The refleciton ratio for Country B, in relation to the U.S., 
is therefore .22. . ■
The reflection ratios in most studies are estimated by the 
average import share. The portion of U.S. aid returned to the U.S. 
through successive rounds of spending is estimated by raising the power 
of the matrix of reflection ratios.
^^^Hicks, "Estimating the Foreign Exchange Costs," pp. 168-174-
Salant, Balance of Payments in 1968, pp. 275-277, based on 
Whitney Hicks, "A Matrix for Estimating the Foreign Exchange Cost of 
Foreign Assistance," AID memorandum (August 31, 1962).
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TABLE 10 
ASSUMED TRADE MATRIX
Spending Country
Recipient Country US
US —  00 .10 .50
A 00 —  .70 .10
B 00 00   .40
C 00 00 •20 ---
Source: Walter S. Salant, et.al., The United States Balance
of Payments in 1968 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1963), p. 275.
The following conclusions become apparent from Hick’s study:
1. The balance-of-payments effect of aid varies widely among 
the various aid recipients.
2. Tying of aid would alter trade patterns.
3. Aid-tying can not be expected to improve the balance of pay­
ments by an amount equal to the aid flow since the U.S. 
receives a considerable portion of aid funds through nor­
mal trade patterns.
The reflection-ratio methodology is criticized on the follow­
ing points:
1. The ratios are derived from a trade matrix, rather than a 
payments matrix.
^^^Hicks, "Estimating the Foreign Exchange Costs," p. 173.
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2. It Is assumed that an increment in foreign exchange is 
spent in the same manner as total foreign exchange earnings.
3. The reflection ratios of the major aid recipients are high­
er than the regional average. When the regional ratios 
are used, respending effects of aid are understated and
the adverse effect of aid on the balance of payments is 
139overstated.
The Brookings Institution Study^^^
The study to estimate the balance-of-payments Impact of pro­
jected changes in economic assistance for 1968 and of procureemnt re­
strictions is a pioneer effort. Previously, little attention had been 
given to the following factors:
1. The "ultimate impact" of foreign economic assistance on 
thé U.S. balance of payments.
2. The effectiveness of procurement restrictions.
3. The extent to which aid dollars return to the U.S. through 
normal commercial channels in the absence of tying.
4. The substitution effect in which aid recipients use tied 
aid to finance goods normally purchased in the U.S.
The limitations of the study are recognized by. the authors but 
their goal is accomplished--to point out unanswered questions and offer 
estimates, even though crude and imprecise, to serve as a starting point 
for a more thorough analysis.
^^^Salant, The Balance of Payments in 1968, p. 277.
^^^Walter S. Salant, et al., The United States Balance of Pay­
ments in 1968 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1963).
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Short-run impact
The reflection—ratio technique is used to measure the percent­
age of untied aid funds respent in the U.S. which are assumed to be 
spent as ordinary export earnings. Using a matrix of trade relation­
ships to estimate the "feedback ratios," the percentage of aid funds 
estimated to be respent in the U.S. is calculated and summarized in 
Table 11.
TABLE 11 
SPENDING OF AID AND SUBSTITUTION
• FOR NORMAL U.S. IMPORTS®
AID Substi­ ILC^ Sub­
Responding tution for stitution
of Untied Normal U.S. for Normal
Aided Region Aid In U.S. Imports US Imports
Latin America 55 40 90
Far East (excluding Japan) 47 35 85
Near East and South Asia 31 25 75
Africa 15 20 70
Percentages calculated using 1960 matrix of trade relation- 
b.
ships.
Irrevocable Letters of Credit
Source: Walter S. Salant, et al.. The United States Balance
of Payments in 1968 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1963), pp. 171-173.
Substitution occurs more frequently in regions with strong 
trade ties to the U.S. and where a large portion of total aid is tied. 
When AID funds finance goods normally purchased by a country, foreign 
exchange is freed to finance other goods according to the country's
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trade pattern. The study does not claim scientific derivation of 
these substitution percentages; they are called "educated guesses."
In 1963 AID shifted from cash grants to Irrevocable letters 
of credit which do not appear in the balance of payments until they 
are drawn. At that time, the exports are reported as "Involving no 
Immediate dollar outflow." The irrevocable letters of credit are not 
very effective In Increasing U.S. exports.
Long-run, respending effect
Using the trade matrix and feedback ratios, the respending 
effects of $1,000 of aid made available under three circumstances are 
estimated and the results summarized in Table 12. The balance-of—pay­
ments cost of untied aid Is not the same In each region but would be 
the least In Latin America ($450) and the highest in Africa ($850) be­
cause Africa Is not normally a strong trading partner of the U.S.
Tying arrangements reduce the balance-of-payments cost considerably 
In the long-run. Even the Irrevocable letter of credit, where substitu­
tion Is high for major trading partners, cost is reduced since some of 
the aid funds are captured In second and third round spending through 
normal trade channels.
Lynn's Empirical Analysis 
The reflectlon-ratlo technique. In conjunction with a variety 
of reserve-accumulation assumptions. Is used to estimate the following 
effects:
pp. 171-173.
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TABLE 12
COMPARATIVE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS COST 
OF $1000 IN ASSISTANCE
Untied Aid
Country
Feedback Untimately Spent 
Ratios . in the U.S.
Balance—of—Pay— 
....ments Cost
Latin America 
Far East 
Near East and 
South Asia 
Africa
.55 .55 X 1000 = 550 
.47 .47 X 1000 = 470
.31 .31 X 1000 = 310 
.15 .15 X 1000 = 150
1000 - 550 = 450 
1000 - 470 = 530
1000 - 310 = 690 
1000 - 150 = 850
Country
Substitution for Portion Respent 
Normal Imports® in the U.S.'’
Balance-of-Payments
Cost
Tied Commodity Aid
Latin America 
Far East 
Near East and 
South Asia 
Africa
.50 X 1000=500 .55 X 500 = 275 
.45 X 1000 = 450 .47 X 450 = 212
.35 X 1000= 350 .31 X 350=108.5 
.30 X 1000 = 300 .15 X 300 = 45
500 - 275 = 225 
450 - 212 = 238
350 - 108.5 = 241.5 
300 - 45 = 255
Irrevocable Letter of Credit
Latin America 
Far East 
Near East and 
South Asia 
Africa
.90 X 1000= 900 .55 X 900 = 495 
.85 X 1000= 850 .47 X 850 = 400
.75 X 1000= 750 .31 X 750= 233 
.70 X 1000= 700 .15 X 700 = 105
900 - 495 = 405 
850 - 400 = 450
750 - 233 = 517 
700 - 105 = 595
^The percentages of AID funcs substituted for normal U.S. im­
ports are assumed to be 10 points higher in 1958 than in 1951. Thus, 
the rate of substitution for AID tied commodities is higher than the 
rates given in Table 11.
^Since some of the goods supplied through aid are substitutes
for normal U.S. purchases, foreign exchange is freed which will be 
spent according to the U.S. normal trade share matrix. Table 11.
Source: Based on Walter S. Salant, et al.. The United States
Balance of Payments in 1968 (Washington, B.C. 
Brookings Institution, 1953), pp. 173-174.
The
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1. The Impact of U.S. foreign economic aid on U.S. exports 
to aid recipients during 1954—1963-
2. The additional U.S. exports to aid recipients resulting 
from the tied aid policy.
3. The recipient's ability to use tied aid to finance goods 
normally imported from the U.S.^^^
Lynn developed a slngle-equatlon, multiple regression model 
describing U.S. exports to developing countries as a function of (1) 
the volume of foreign exchange available and (2) the established trade 
patterns. The available foreign exchange Is assumed to be equal to 
the total Imports of the country. The U.S. market share of the recip­
ient's total Imports for the preceding year Is taken as a proxy for the 
determinants of trade patterns. Coefficients are estimated using ordi­
nary least squares estimation procedures with cross section data for 
forty-three aid recipient countries for 1954-1963.
The model
The basic equation in the model determining the U.S. exports 
to a given country Is:
E = Ü.Q + + n^X^ + + b^A + 6^A^ + 6^0 + +
142 ^Lynn» An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Foreign Economic Aid,
pp. 3-4. _
Ibid.. pp. 37-45.
^^^Ibld., pp. 41-43. E = U^. exports to a country. and^X^ = 
dummy variables for countrieg In the Dollar and Sterling Area. A — Amer­
ican aid loans and grants. A = Export—Import Bank loans. A^ = PL 480 
shipments. R= official funds. F-Aj= total supply of foreign exchange 
available to importers. £7=F-(R+A^A^+A^)=other foreign exchange. S _ = 
the observed U.S. share of the country * s market in the preceding period.
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To modify the model to apply to tied aid the following variables are 
summed:
1. U.S. exports which would have been purchased with the aid 
without the tying restriction— (1 - a)y A^,
2. The portion of untied aid used to finance U.S. exports—
(1 - o) (1 -y) A^ .
3. Additional U.S. exports due to the limited scope for tied— 
aid substitution —  ayA^ — 0M*.
4. U.S. exports financed with non-aid foreign exchange— M*.
The equation for determining U.S. exports with the tied aid conditions 
included becomes:
. E = (1 - a) (1 - y) + yA^ + (1 -
Therefore, a tied aid policy may result in an increase in U.S. exports 
if the recipient is unable to substitute the aid funds for free foreign 
exchange previously used in the purchase of U.S. exports.
The empirical results
Of the many hypotheses tested in Lynn’s study, one of the most 
significant tests is the estimation of the scope for tied aid substitu­
tion (M / ayA^) for individual aid recipients. In one test, based on 
pooled data for 1958—1960, Pakistan, India, Sudan, Ethiopia, Viet Nam,
145Ibid., pp. 23-26, 43-45. The symbols are defined as: a-the 
proportion of tied aid which the country would prefer to spend in third 
countries, y = the proportion of aid which is tied. M *= the volume of 
Imports from the U.S. normally not financed by aid. ayA^ = the portion 
of tied aid which the recipient would spend in third countries if the 
aid were not tied. 0 = index of tied—aid substitution; the value is 
zero if no substitution occurs, unity if substitution occurs to the 
maximum.
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and Bolivia were identified as having a limited scope for substitution.
where M /a*vA^ < 1.^^^ See Table 13.
TABLE 13
SCOPES FOR TIED AID SUBSTITUTION
Country 1962 1963
Bolivia 1.47 .73
China (Taiwan) 4.63 7.04
Dominican Republic 2.93 1.83
United Arab Republic 15.09 4.27
Ethiopia .27 .55
Haiti 10.45 18.55
India 1.79 .86
Indonesia 3.69 — — — —
Iran 4.48 6.15
Israel 8.09 8.65
Korea 1.52 2.80
Libya 3.43 4.14
Monocco 2.09 2.66
Pakistan .74 .88
Paraguay 3.68 3.12
Sudan .46 .57
Thailand 9.52 5.99
Tunisia 8.96 3.93
Turkey 1.35 1.40
Viet Nam .52 .26
Source: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., "An Empirical Analysis of U.S.
Foreign Economic Aid and the U.S. Balance of Payments, 
1954—1963," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale 
University, 1966), pp. 90-93.
The 1958-1960 period is considered representative of U.S. ex­
ports in 1962 and 1963 if a tied aid policy had not been in effect. U.S.
competitiveness had begun to deteriorate as a result of the general
147development of Western Europe and Japan.
pp. 23-26, 43-45, 52-54, 87-115. ^^^Ibld.. pp. 73-6.
80
The respendlng effects
The total Impact of U.S. aid on the balance-of-payments, after 
the full effect of aid respending in third countries and their trading 
partners has stimulated imports from the U.S. to the was esti­
mated and is summarized in Table 14. A trade matrix, representing each 
country's share of the market, was developed and the first round 
effect of a U.S. aid dollar on the exports of major trading regions 
was estimated. The increased exports of major trading regions of the 
world stimulate an increase in imports from the U.S., which is added 
to the first round U.S. exports to arrive at the full impact on U.S. 
exports of an aid dollar.
TABLE 14
TOTAL IMPACT OF ONE DOLLAR OF "AMERICAN" AID ON U.S. EXPORTS 
UNDER FOUR RESERVE ACCUMULATION ASSUMPTIONS
Assumptions
Region 2b 3*= 4-^
Latin America .389 .464 .496 .896
Middle East .154 .269 .319 .842
Africa .065 .184 .218 .895
Asia .161 .335 .367 .769
Canada, the United Kingdom, the Common Market countries, other 
Western European countries, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and 
Japan add increased foreign exchange earnings to reserves.
^The European Common Market countries and other Western Euro­
pean countries only add increased foreign exchange earnings to reserves.
^Only Common Market countries add increæed foreign to reserves.
^ o  country adds increased foreign exchange earnings to reserves.
Source: Lynn, An Empirical Analysis. pp. 113-114.
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The bâlance-of-payments cost of U.S. aid depends on (1) the 
aid recipient's ability to substitute aid funds for imports normally 
purchased through trade channels and (2) the extent to which U.S. ex­
ports are stimulated when aid funds are respent through normal trade 
channels. The conclusion of Lynn's study points to the bigger 
issue of the U.S.'s competitive position in world markets. Recognizing 
the respending power of aid funds, it is impossible to separate the 
balance-of-payments cost of aid and the U.S.'s ability to recover 
these funds in normal trading operations.
Cooper's Model to Estimate the 
Additionality Factor
An alternative method for determining additional exports re­
sulting from tied aid, i.e. the "additionality factor," is defined as 
the ratio of the flow of additional U.S. exports to the flow of funds: 
a — (X - X )/A where a is the additionality factor, X is the U.S. ex­
ports subsequent to lending, X is the U.S. exports prior to lending 
and . is the amount of assistance. Cooper defines "additional exports" 
as those U.S. exports which the aid recipient would not have purchased
without the aid, financed by both the aid funds and the country’s free 
149foreign exchange.
This definition differs from that used by Lynn and AID studies, 
"accounting methodology," which identifies additional exports as those
pp. 121-125.
149Cooper, The Additionality Factor, pp. 1—9.
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exports financed through aid, which would not have been exported with­
out aid. Cooper's definition includes U.S. exports financed out of the 
aid recipient's free foreign exchange. Secondly, the trade bounds in 
Cooper's model are set by a (the U.S. share of the trade market) and 
1 + a*. The accounting methodology requires that the two components 
add to 100 per cent since it is concerned with the allocation of aid 
funds. The boundary is, therefore, between 0 and 1.^^^
Since additionality is the major factor in the determination 
of the cost of aid to the U.S., misspecification of the additionality 
factor, which is Cooper's criticism of the accounting method, under­
estimates the effect of U.S. lending on exports and overestimates the 
balance-of-payments cost of aid.
The model
Two factors must be determined;
1. The amount of U.S. exports in the absence of assistance. 
This cannot be observed but must be estimated by an econ­
ometric model.
2. The amount of U.S. exports during the existence of an 
assistance program, which can be observed.
Sources of the additionality factor are:
1. The portion of assistance financing the aid recipient's 
imports from the U.S. which normally would have been pur­
chased from third countries, i.e. effectively tied aid.
pp. 2-3. 5-9, 16, 26, 28.
^^^Ibld., pp. 6-7.
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2. Increased purchases of commodities from the U.S. through
normal trading patterns due to the additional foreign ex-
152change supplied by U.S. assistance.
To determine additional U.S. exports to aid recipients, a model 
of the aid recipient's importing behavior in the absence of aid is con­
structed. Additional exports are found by subtracting the amount of 
exports that would have occurred in the absence of aid from the observ­
ed level of exports with an aid program.
The importing behavior of aid recipients is predicted under 
three situations:
1. No assistance program. U.S. exports prior to lending =
X* = o M*
2. An untied assistance program. U.S. exports subsequent 
to lending = X — oM + oÂ = oM
3. Tied assistance program. X = o ( M - A ) + a A  + ti
where o is the U.S. market share normally, ct is the additional amount 
of exports generated by the assistance, Y is the portion of aid spent 
on U.S. goods which are higher priced than the world market price, M 
is the total commodity imports of the developing countries prior to 
lending (an unobserved variable), M is the total imports of the devel­
oping countries subsequent to lending and a = a + y is the addition- 
154ality factor.
^^^Ibid.. pp. 7-9. ^^^Ibid.. pp; 7, 15.
154ibid.. pp. 9-17.
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The set of conditions are: 0 0 < y ^ l ; < a < l  + a
and the appropriate specification of the hounds are o and 1 + a .
The value of the additionality factor (a) will be between the U.S. 
market share of the recipient's imports (a) and one plus the U.S. mar­
ket share (1 + a), If tying is ineffective, U.S. exports will equal 
the amount normally purchased from the U.S. by .the recipient (o&. If 
tying is completely effective, the recipient will spend all of the 
assistance in the U.S. plus continué to purchase the commodities nor­
mally imported from the U.S. In this case, the additionality factor 
is greater than one, i.e.(1 + a). The larger the additionality factor, 
the smaller the balance—of—payments loss to the aid donor
Empirical results
The additionality factor is estimated for 20 of the largest 
aid recipients, representing 85 per cent of the U.S. development assist­
ance loans. Countries with additionality factor greater than 1 increase 
exports from the U.S. by an amount greater than the size of the aid
^^^Ibid., pp. 16-17. The possibility of encountering statis­
tical errors is present in both cross-sectional and time series data. 
Cooper rejected the cross-sectional data because this approach would re­
quire the assumption be made that o and a are the same for each country. 
Additionally, there is the possibility of heteroscedasticity (lack of 
constant variance in the error term) . To assume that market trade shares 
and additionality factors were identical among countries would be a 
serious error since they vary tremendously from country to country and 
appear to be correlated with the geographical location. The time 
series approach also has problems in that a and a , although unique with 
each country, are assumed invariant with respect to time. There is 
also the possibility that the disturbance terms are serially correlated, 
a problem frequently encountered in time series studies in which the 
errors in one time period are dependent on errors in previous periods. 
Cooper, pp. 20-21.
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TABLE 15
SUMMARY OF ADDITIONALITY FACTOR ESTIMATES AND INCREASE IN U.S. 
EXPORTS RESULTING FROM 1969 U.S. DEVELOPMENT LOAN PROGRAM
Country
Development
Assistance
Loans
A
Addition­
ality
Factor
a
Additional
U.S.
Exports
Sa
Colombia 73.8 0.768 56.7
Costa Rica 5.8 0.740 4.3
Dominican Republic 12.7 0.582 7.4
Bolivia 16.9 0.416 7.0
Brazil 76.3 0.949 72.4
Chile 38.7 0.049 1.9
Congo 0.4 0.637 0.2
Ghana 15.2 0.639 9.7
Morocco 9.0 0.488 4.4
Nigeria 4.8 4.675 22.4
Tunisia 1.0 1.177 1.2
Greece 3.0 0.971 2.9
Israel 2.4 0.775 1.9
Turkey 62.7 1.080 67.7
India 220.8 1.026 226.5
Pakistan 151.9 0.906 137.7
Indonesia 23.4 1.444 33.8
Korea 31.0 1.106 34.3
Philippines 3.3 0.996 3.3
Taiwan 3.0 0.934 3.0
Source: Based on Cooper, The Additionality Factor, Tables 2,
6, 7, 9, 10, pp. 26-27, 40-41, 43-44, 61-62, 64-65.
program. The additionality factor of 6 of the 20 countries was greater 
than 1 and 5 countries had an additionality factor of at least .9. This 
indicates that for these countries tying was effective in increasing 
U.S. exports. Only 3 of the countries had an additionality factor of 
less than .5.
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The apparently limited effectiveness of tying arrangements 
was concentrated in South America where the U.S. market share of com­
mercial exports is high and there is a good opportunity for substitu­
tion of aid-financed imports for goods normally purchased from the U.S.
Cooper's results can be compared to Lynn's. The additionality 
factor was estimated by Lynn to be between .3 and .7. Cooper estimated 
the value to be .6 for South America and the Caribbean and .9 for the 
remainder of the recipients.
Respending Effects of Untying Aid According 
to Chu and Shishko's Estimation
The U.S. will experience an initial balance-of-payments loss 
if aid is untied. However, part of the loss will be recovered. Coun­
tries experiencing an increase in exports will increase imports from 
the U.S. and the U.S., experiencing a decrease in income, will respond 
by decreasing imports. The two actions will work to partially offset
the balance-of-payments loss of untying aid.^^^
Neither the reflection—rtio nor reserve-accumulating techniques 
are used. Instead, a multisector multiplier model is developed with 
final income changes coming from three sources;
1. Autonomous changes in income.
2. Self-induced changes in income (domestic multiplier).
3. Changes in income resulting from changes in exports to 
other countries (foreign trade multiplier)
^^^Chu and Shishko, The Respending Effects of Untying Aid, pp.
ili, V ,  vi, 1, 6 .
p. 6,
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The model
X38Two sets of parameters are estimated from time series data:
1. The marginal propensity to spend on domestic goods (HPC)•
2. The marginal propensity to spend on imported goods (MPI).
The final changes in Income, I.e. the respendlng gain by the
U.S. is estimated by the equation: d V ^  d
where cfA^  is the autonomous change In country 1, d V ^ and d V ^  and final
changes in income in countries 2 and 3, is the MPC in country 1 and
17^ 2^ and are MPI of countries 2 and 3 to import from country 1.
Given the initial change In exports and income brought on by 
untying aid, the subsequent changes can be found for country 1 by:
1 - dVg + ^^3 is the change in exports in countryl.
2 . = (m^2 + d V y^ is the change in imports of country 1.
3. 4 ^  - 4^^ Is the respendlng effect on the balance of pay­
ments of country
The empirical results
In all cases, under all alternatives, the U.S. is a first- 
round loser. The loss is the greatest for unilateral untying and least 
for multilateral untying. Other countries experiencing first—round 
losses are Canada, Germany, and France.
^^^The parameters are estimated for a world of 15 regions: U.S., 
Canada, U.K., Germany, France, Japan, Caribbean, South America, EEC, 
other European countries, Africa, Middle East, South Asia, Far East, 
Australia-New Zealand-South Africa (ANZA).
1 59 Chu and Shishko, The Respending Effects of Untying Aid, p. 6 . 
p. 8 . pp. 27-34.
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The respendlng effect Is examined under two sets of policies:
1. The existence or absence of compensatory fiscal-monetary 
policies by first-round losers,
2. The existence or absence of foreign-exchange constraint 
in the aid recipient.
The conclusion reached is:
• . • if development loans were untied, between 6 and 33 per cent 
of the U.S. first—round loss would be recouped in respending ef­
fects, depending on the definition of aid used, the circumstances 
under which lending is untied, the stabilization-policy reactions 
of the countries involved, and whether or not the import behavior 
of the recipient is foreign-exchange constrained.163
The results are summarized in Tables 16 and 18.
About half of the respending gain is the result of reduced 
U.S. Imports when Income falls. If the U.S. pursues compensatory fis­
cal and monetary policies to bolster domestic income, U.S. imports 
would not decrease,
If the aid recipients are not foreign-exchange constrained 
and imports are assumed to be a function of income, 40 to 80 per cent 
of any increase in export earnings will be respent. If the recipients 
are foreign-exchange constrained, the U.S. can expect to recover 17 
to 29 per cent of the first-round loss.^^^
pp. 8-10, 25-26, 30-33, 47.
^^^Ibld.. p. 47
^^^Ibid.. pp. 32-33, 47-48.
^®^Ibid., pp.- 25-26, 32-33, 47. Also, Table 8 , p. 31.
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TABLE 16
RESPENDING EFFECTS OF UNTYING U.S. AID ON 
U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Percent Respending Gain of First-Round Loss^
First-Round
Vector^ A*^  B*^  C® D^
1 15.2 7.3 17.0 9.3
2 15.0 10.0 18.7 14.1
7 18.9 21.7 28.9 33.2
^The trade definition used is la, defined as merchandise 
trade less military assistance program (MAP), for the period 1958-1968*
^The vectors are defined in Table 17.
^No region is foreign-exchange constrained; no first-round 
loser undertakes compensatory fiscal or monetary policy.
*^ First—round losers compensate with monetary aid fiscal policies,
^Recipients are foreign-exchange constrained.
^Recipients are foreign-exchange constrained and first-round
losers compensate.
Source: Chu and Shishko, The Respending Effects of Untying
Aid, based on Table 8, p. 31.
TABLE 17 
DEFINITIONS OF VECTORS
Only All DAC Coun­ Only Explicit­ All Loans U.S. Loans
Vector U.S. tries Except ly Tied Loans Are at 1969
Number Unties France Untie Are Untied Untied Level
1 X X X
2 X X X
7= X X
^U.S. Loans are reduced 13%; Loans to South Asia are reduced. 
Source: Chu and Shishko, based on Table 7, p. 28.
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TABLE 18
SHORT- AÎ5D LONG-RUN EFFECTS ON EXPORTS 
FROM UNTYING OF AID^
First Round Changes 
Vectors^
Respending Effects 
Vectors*^
Country I 2 7 I .2 7
U.S. -467.8 -352.3 -167.9 71.2 52.9 31.8
Canada 12.7 - 25.6 - 28.6 - 10.4 8.4 12.3
Caribbean 2.0 3.1 4.1 - 0.2 - 0.9 - 1.4
South
America 6.4 8.8 II. 7 I.O 0.6 - 1.0
U.K. 72.3 46.1 - 10.3 - 17.2 - 7.7 7.8
Germany 73.3 52.3 -127.7 - 3.2 3.2 53.2
France 41.7 - 53.7 - 76.3 2.4 26.8 22.7
Other EEC 67.4 90.6 91.1 - 20.6 - 36.6 - 51.5
Other
Europe 59.8 87.6 74.9 - 10.3 - 22.1 - 25.7
Africa 3.9 8.1 II.2 5.6 2.8 - 3.4
Middle
East 7.6 14.1 18.6 5.1 2.9 O.I
South Asia 3.2 8.0 12.8 — 0.6 - 1.3 - 1.8
Japan 79.8 34.9 82.9 - 5.7 9.2 7.8
Far East 16.0 32.9 42.4 - 13.6 - 28.0 - 35.9
AHZA 21.7 45.2 61.1 - 3.5 - 10.8 - 15.1
In millions of U.S. dollars.
The respending effects assume the base case and trade defini­
tion la, defined in Table 16.
^The vectors are explained in Table 17.
Source: Based on Chu and Shishko, The Respendlng Effects of
Untying Aid. Appendixes D and E, Tables D-I, E-I, 
pp. 61, 63.
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Comprehensive Model of the Impact of Untying 
Aid on the U.S. Balance of Payments
In this model, the three parameters estimated are:
1. The pattern of trade financed by untied aid.^^^
2. The exports financed with tied aid.^^^
3. The relationship between the initial change and the long-
run change in trade flows caused by untying aid,^^^
The three types of untying decisions examined are:
1. Unilateral untying of all export procurement restrict- 
i o n s . l G S
2. Reciprocal untying by all aid donors.
3. Reciprocal untying agreement with a subset of aid donors.
The model
The model depends on two basic concepts, the trade shares and
the additionality factor. Trade-share matrices of "commercial" ex- 
172ports are developed to estimate changes in trade patterns if aid is 
untied and the results summarized in Table 19. The U.S.'s decreasing 
share of world exports and the wide variations among the importing 
regions are significant factors.
^^^Robert Slighton, et al.. The Effect of Untied Development 
Loans on the U.S. Balance of Payments, pp. 6-35.
pp. 36-47. ^^^Ibld.. pp. 72-86. ^^^Ibld..pp. 47-52.
^’°Ibid., pp.53-64. ^^^Ibid.. pp. 64-71.
172Ibid., Table 1, p. 12. Commercial exports are defined as: 
Total DOT exports - (U.S. special category exports + PL 480 exports + 
Sino—Soviet exports + AID financed exports) + non—additional (1—a) AID 
financed exports less 90 per cent of total development assistance, ex­
cluding technical assistance, by countries other than the U.S.; a == .6 
for Latin America, a » .9 elsewhere.
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TABLE 19 
U.S. SHARE OF EXPORTS 1962-1970
Other
South Other Middle South Far
Tear Caribbean America Europe Africa East Asia East
Average Share of Total DOT Exports
1962-1965 .576 .331 .095 .100 .228 .362 .280
1966-1968 .545 .330 .093 .103 .192 .332 .261
1969-1970 .511 .302 .082 .099 .180 .237 .207
Average Share of Commercial Exports
1962-1965 .578 .311 .096 .072 .157 .124 .251
1966-1968 .543 .314 .099 .082 .164 .112 .221
Synthetic Trade-Share Matrix A^
1966-1968 .520 .395 .140 .115 .200 .171 .225
The synthetic trade-share matrix A was developed to reflect 
more realistic assumptions. The average share matrix for cotmnerical 
exports for 1966-1968 was modified to reflect (1) the differences in 
IBRD/IDA data and commercial trade data, (2) exports originating in the 
developing countries, (3) trends in export shares, and (4) the Dec­
ember 1971 exchange rate realignment. Slighton, The Effect of Untied 
Development Loans on the U.S. Balance of Payments, pp. 31-35.
Source: Robert Slighton, et al.. The Effect of Untied Dev­
elopment Loans on the U.S. Balance of Payments. A 
Report Prepared for AID, R-975-ÂID (Santa Monica, Ca.: 
The RAND Corporation, June, 1972), based on Tables 5 
and 11, pp. 19, 33.
The "additionality factor", measuring the effectiveness of 
tying arrangements in affecting the trade pattern of exports, is defined 
as - X^y ) / A^y where X^y is the observed flow of exports
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from donor country Â. to aid recipient country X - • is the unobserved
value of the flow of exports from country to / if A . . equals zero,
173and A - • is the value of the tied aid program.
There is no constraint on the value of a.,. The additionality 
factor was estimated by ordinary least squares regression analysis of 
time series data on development assistance. The basic equation is 
■^S “ ^ (o - a)A + u, where is the US share of exports to the
developing countries, a is the U.S. share of commercial exports, M is 
the total value of imports of the developing countries, a is the addi­
tionality factor, and A is the amount of development assistance.
The larger the U.S.'s share of commercial exports, the smaller 
the additionality factor since it becomes easy to substitute aid-fin­
anced imports for goods normally financed with free foreign exchange.
If tying is effective additionality will approximate (y + a) where y 
is the proportion of tied aid which must be used to purchase U.S. goods, 
even though they are higher than the world market p r i c e . T h e  addi­
tionality factor was estimated under a variety of conditions and the 
results summarized in Table 20. . .
First-round effect of untying 
Unilateral untying
The authors suggest that additionality assumption (3) and 
export-share assumption (3) are the most r e a l i s t i c . T h e  initial
p. 36. pp. 40-42. ^^^Ibid.. p. 40.
^^^Ibld.. pp. 51-52, Table 15, p. 51.
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TABLE 20
U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS INITIAL COST OF 
UNILATERAL UNTYING OF AID^
Additionality Assumptions
Export Share 
Assumptions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)t
CD - 40.0 - 46.5 - 49.0 - 59.5 - 67.3
(2) - 40.8 - 47.3 - 49.8 - 60.4 - 68.1
(3) - 38.5 - 45.0 . - 47.5 - 58.1 — 66,6
(4) - 37.4 - 43.8 — 46.4 - 55.9 — 64.6
^The net losses are presented as a percentage of the U.S. 
development loan program.
^It is assumed that no procurement switching takes place and 
is included as a benchmark since the greater the additionality factor, 
the greater the balance-of-payments cost of untying aid.
Additionality assumptions:
CD a-- = .5 for Latin America; -8 for the rest of the world.
C2) = ,55 for Latin America; .9 for India; .85 for the rest
of the world.
C3) a.. = .6 for Latin America; .9 for the rest of the world.
(4) - .75 for Latin America; 1.0 for the rest of the world.
C5) = 1.0 for all countries
Export share assumptions:
CD ■ = U.S. share of 1965-1970 IBRD/IDA exports.
C2) a ..= U.S. share of 1966-1968 commercial exports.
. . . . .
(3) = synthetic export matrix A.
C4) = synthetic export matrix B.
Source: Based on Slighton, et al., The Effect of Untied Dev­
elopment Loans oh the U.S. Balance of Payments.
Table 15, p. 51.
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U.S. balance-of-payments loss resulting from unilateral untying is 
estimated to be 47.5 per cent of the aid program. See Table 20. In 
comparison, multilateral untying by all DAC countries is estimated to 
be 35.1 per cent. See Table 21.
Multilateral untying
The result of multilaterally untying aid depends on the export- 
share and additionality assumptions and the U.S. share of world develop­
ment aid. For example, under additionality assumption (3), if the ratio 
of U.S. aid to the aid of other DAC countries is 1.094, the balance-of- 
payments loss is 35.1 per cent. If the U.S. ratio of total aid is .615, 
the loss is 24.6 per cent.^^^ The geographical distribution of aid is 
also significant. If the proportion of aid going to South Asia is 
reduced from 43 per cent of total U.S. aid to 27 per cent, the loss 
. would decrease from 41.8 to 36.0 per cent.
Untying by a subset of donors
The major difficulty here is in specifying the joint addition­
ality parameter for the subset, i.e. the proportion of aid-financed 
exports procured from non-participating countries.Administrative 
machinery can be established, although cumbersome, to insure that aid 
funds are spent in countries participating in the untying agreement.
^^^Ibid.. Table 17, p. 56.
^^®Ibid., p. 64, Table 17 p. 56, Table 19 p. 59.
•*-'^ Ibld., pp. 64-65.
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TABLE 21
THE U.S. BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS EFFECT OF RECIPROCAL 
UNTYING OF AID BY A SUBSET OF DAC DONORS^
Loans Eligible for Loans Eliglbile for
Untying are the Same Untying are the Same
Type of Untying as Tied Development as Total Develotjment
Agreement Loans in 1969 Loans in 1969*
Multilateral
Untying - 35.1 27.7
Reciprocal Untying 
by all DAC Countries 
Other Than: Case 1*^ Case 2 ^ Case 1*^ Case 2 ^
Canada - 35.7 -  36.1 - 28.1 -  28.7
France - 36.4 - 37.6 - 28.8 - 30.6
Japan - 35.0 - 38.5 - 26.3 - 31.1
United Kingdom - 34.6 - 36.9 - 28.3 - 30.9
Germany - 34.1 - 37.0 - 30.5 - 33.6
Canada & France - 37.1 - 38.6 - 29.4 - 31.6
^ h e  changes in U.S. exports are represented as percentages 
of U.S. development loans. The additionality assumption (3) and 
export-share assumption (3) are made.
^Because aid programs consist of a mix of formally and 
informally tied aid, the tied aid funds are often difficult to identify 
so total development loans were tested.
^Administrative machinery is established to prevent nonparti­
cipating countries from gaining exports.
^ o  machinery is established and non-participating donors 
obtain their normal "commercial" share of all exports financed by the 
development assistance of the subset.
Source: Slighton, et. al., The Effect of Untied Development
Loans on the U.S. Balance of Payments, based on 
Tables 20 and 21, pp. 68, 69.
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Respending effect
If the U.S. does not follow a  fiscal-monetary policy that 
compensates for the income effects of the first—round change in exports» 
the balance-of-payments can recover approximately 14 to 17 per cent 
of the initial loss which resulted from untying. If the U.S. does 
follow such a policy, only approximately 5 to 7 per cent of the initial 
loss will be recovered.
The U.S. can expect to lose 43 per cent of the untied aid if 
aid is untied unilaterally and 30 to 32 per cent if multilaterally 
untied. Since U.S. imports are expected to decrease in response to 
the fall in income, the total balance-of-payments loss is estimated 
to be 37 per cent for unilateral untying and 26 to 28 per cent for 
multilateral untying,
Summa-ry
There are two major economic problems facing developing coun­
tries today— the mounting debt service burden and the increased pro­
curement restriction provisions. Both conditions increase the cost of 
aid to the recipient and both reduce the value of the aid. Yet, both 
achieve a major objective of the donor— that of reducing the balance- 
of-payments effect of aid commitments for the donor. The purpose of 
this chapter has been to examine the tying restrictions and to present 
the theoretical analysis of the short- and long-run balance-of-payments 
effect of tying and untying aid.
pp. 72-85.
. pp. 91-92.
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Aid—tying policies became more prevalent in the early 1960's 
in response to balance-of-payment deficits and pressure to expand 
exports. Tying aid insures the attainment of other objectives, espe­
cially the identification of projects with the donor. Project aid is 
especially useful in the "billboard" effect and tying agreements are 
usually successful. Program aid serves the overall development objec­
tives of the recipient but tying is not very successful.
The most difficult aspect to measure is the amount of substi­
tution of aid-financed goods for items normally imported from the 
donor.
The short-run effectiveness of aid-tying restrictions can be 
measured by the additionality factor, which attempts to measure the 
U.S. exports which would not have been purchased in the absence of aid.
The long-run effect depends upon the U.S.’s trade relations 
with the trading partners of the world. The aid funds spent in these 
countries enable them to increase imports from the U.S. The respend­
ing effect is measured by reflection-ratio, reserve-accumulation, and 
the multisector multiplier models.
The conclusions of the specific studies analyzed are:
1. The Brooking Institute study showed that some methods of 
tying are more effective than others. Substitution is 
between 20 and 40 per cent for AID funds but irrevocable 
letters of credit are almost ineffective, allowing for 
substitution of 70 to 90 per cent.
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2. The geographical location of the funds influence the 
effectiveness of tying. If the area is a major trading 
partner, there is more opportunity for substitution. If 
the "scope for tied aid substitution" is larger than one, 
Lynn's study showed that it is possible that no increase 
in U.S. exports will result from tying.
3. Even though aid funds may be lost to the donor initially, 
they may be recovered through normal trading channels.
4. The foreign exchange position of the recipient influences 
the additionality factor. If the recipient is foreign 
exchange constrained, the tying will be effective.
5. The donor's fiscal and monetary policies will affect the 
long-run results. Recovering the balance-of-payments loss 
depends, in part, on a decrease in the donor's imports,
in response to the decrease in export income. U.S. 
imports will remain at the same level if policies are 
enacted which prevent the fall in income.
6. The cooperation of other aid donors in reducing tying 
restrictions can reduce the balance-of-payments loss from 
43 per cent for unilateral untying and 30 per cent if 
aid is untied multilaterally.
7. The U.S. share of the export market is significant in 
recovering aid funds through normal commercial trade 
channels. The donor could protect its export market by 
becoming more competitive and increasing the market 
share of trade.
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The effectiveness of aid—tying depends upon many factors.
It can not be assumed that all tied aid will be recovered. However, 
the balance-of-payments loss is not as great in the long run as the 
short run. The donor's power in achieving the objective of balance- 
of-payments protection is accomplished as much by its domestic policies 
and reactions as those of the recipients.
CHAPTER V 
DEBT SERVICING 
Introduction
Debt servicing is one of the major economic problems facing 
developing countries today. Many countries, anxious to accomplish 
stated rates of growth, expand borrowings beyond debt-servicing capac- 
city. Capital accumulation has been emphasized as essential to devel­
opment. However, traditional sources of financing, such as domestic 
saving, private capital markets, taxation, and trade surplus, are very 
limited for the developing country. The gap between investment outlays 
and domestic financing is covered by foreign capital. Capital accumu­
lation, therefore, becomes a balance-of—payments issue and a debt- 
servicing problem is created.
Although a country may be in financial trouble because of a 
shortage of qualified leadership and, therefore, mismanagement and 
wastefulness, the ability of a country to service debt is a function of
^^^Gerald M- Meier, International Trade and Development (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 83-115.
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(1) export performance, C2) propensity to import, (3) the amount of 
gross capital inflow, C4) the level of total savings, and C3) the rate
of return on investments. Some factors are within a country's control
_ 183 and some are not.
Debt-servicing payments often grow faster than export earn­
ings, which may be inadequate because of internal problems or external 
market conditions. Foreign capital, largely loans and export credits, 
have little concessionary element. The biggest danger in the use of 
export credit is the reliance on short-term borrowing to finance long­
term investments.However, regardless of the form of debt— whether 
governmental assistance, export credits, or multilateral lending— the 
repayment plus interest puts a strain on the developing country's 
economy.
Much of the debt is created in aid-related programs, espec­
ially the bilateral aid which is usually tied to procurement of 
specific commodities. A good example is the sale of U.S. agricultural 
commodities under Title I of PL 480. This aid program has been criti­
cized as engineered by marketers of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
and not by foreign relation agencies. The debt-servicing problem here, 
expressed by Swerling, is that the accumulation of local currencies,
^^^World Bank, Annual Report 1968, in Leading Issues in 
Economic Development, ed. by Meier, pp. 269-273.
^^^Pearson, Partners in Development, pp. 118-122-
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Increasing at compound rates. Invites, . repudiation or cancel­
lation of debts later.
It was demonstrated in Chapter III, that aid-tying reduces
the grant element which, in effect, increases the rate of interest.
The following example illustrates the increase in effective rate of
interest through aid tying.
• • • suppose that the tying of aid involves a 50 per cent excess 
cost of the project over world market prices, so that the real 
resources provided are worth only two-thirds of their money price. 
This would more than cancel out the transfer involved in a ten- 
year interest-free loan payable in full at maturity where the 
alternative cost of capital was 4 %, or a fifteen-year interest- 
free installment loan at an alternative opportunity cost of capital 
of 5 %.187
This increase in rate of interest must be considered when determining 
the debt-servicing burden and capacity of the aid recipient.
The recipient of tied aid overestimates the real value of the 
loan and underestimates the economic burden of the commitment to 
future repayment. Especially if excess cost is present, the repayment 
of the loan involves returning more real value than was received.
An additional problem with tied aid is that debt-service pay­
ments must be made in free foreign exchange which means the developing
^^^Boris C. Swerling, "Role and Character of Foreign Aid - 
Discussion," American Economic Review . Papers and Proceedings. XLIX.
No. 2 (May, l559T"242=24f7
^^^Harry G. Johnson, Economic Policies Toward Less Developed 
Countries (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 113-118,
^^^Ibid.. n. 14, p. 81.
^^^Ibid.. pp. 80-84. Also, Richard J. Ward, Development 
Issues for for 1970's (New York: Dunellen Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), 
p. 157.
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country must allocate an Increasing share of export earnings to service
debt. Any free foreign exchange used to service debt reduces the net
resource transfer of aid. Resources are transferred from creditor to
debtor only to the extent that the terms involve an element of subsidy
189when compared with terms on commercial loans. ■ These problems of 
". . . aid—tying, competition among the more advanced countries in 
the extension of suppliers' credits, and debt rescheduling. . ." 
are considered the most pressing problems facing developing countries 
today.
Export Credit and Debt Servicing 
Export credit is provided on commercial terms without prepara­
tion of a development program and without coordination of the lending 
which results in "bunching** of debt repayment. The credit-worthiness
of the country is then damaged when financial crises arise and resched-
191uling of debt becomes necessary.
Advanced countries, anxious to promote exports, provide credit 
without adequate consideration of the debt—servicing capacity of the 
debtor country. This practice began in the early 1960*s in a maddening 
push to expand exports to bolster weakening balance of payments.
Johnson, Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries, 
pp. 25, 113-118.
^^^Robert M. Stern, "International Financial Issues in For­
eign Economic Assistance to the Less Developed Countries," in Economic 
Development and Structural Change, ed. by I. G. Stewart (Edinburgh: 
Great Britain: Edinburgh University Press, 1969), p. 61.
^^^earson. Partners in Development, pp. 118-123.
^^^Seymour E, Harris, ed., The Dollar Crisis (New York: Har- 
court. Brace and World, Inc., 1961), pp. 2-3, 18-20. Also, Henry C. 
Wallich, "Government Action" in The Dollar Crisis, pp. 106-107.
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A program of short-term export credit insurance and guarantees
through the Export-Import Bank was established. The mood of the time
was captured in the President's White House Message on Balance of
Payments in 1961:
• • • I am directing the President of the Export—Import Bank . . . 
to prepare and submit . . .  a new program under the Export-Import 
Bank to place our exporters on a basis of full equality with their 
competitors in other countries . . . asked the Secretary of 
Treasury to initiate and submit . . .  a study of methods through 
which private financial institutions can participate more broadly 
in providing export credit f a c i l i t i e s . ^93
This grand-scale export credit provision of the sixties became the
debt-servicing nightmare of the seventies.
Coordination and Cooperation 
To avoid debt-servicing crises, a systematic check of export- 
credit activity and review of long-term public assistance loan commit­
ments should be made on each aid recipient. Although more problems 
arise with export credits, some countries (India and Turkey) face debt-
servicing problems stemming from accumulated official development 
194assistance.
The problems of export credit and official development assist­
ance can not be isolated and solved independently. A wide variation in 
lending terms exist among lending countries. Recent debt-rescheduling 
experiences indicate that private interests gain since the suppliers'
President, Message to Congress, "The White House 
Message on Balance of Payments and Gold," February 6, 1961 in The 
Dollar in Crisis, ed. by Seymour Harris, p. 303.
^^^Stem, "International Financial Issues in Foreign Economic 
Assistance to the Less Developed Countries", in Economic Development , 
and Structural Change, ed. by Stewart^ pp. 55—57.
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credits become converted Into public assistance. Therefore, coordina­
tion of terms of assistance Is necessary since Inequities may be 
created If the hard terms of some donors pre-empt the debt-servicing
capacity of recipients at the expense of the donors providing asslst- 
195ance on soft terms.
Theoretical Framework of Debt- 
Servicing Problems
Theoretical analysis of the problem of servicing developmental
loans began as early as 1946. It was recommended at that time by Hal
Lary that mechanisms be established to provide flexibility in debt-
servicing payments reducing the risk of default and interruption of
the flow of trade.Theoretical work analyzing the structure of the
debt and the debt-servicing capacity of the recipients, the primary
sources of debt-servicing problems. Is reviewed In this section.
Structure of Debt 
The structure of the debt— interest rate, grace period, mat­
urity, procurement restrictions— Is especially Important. The Invest­
ments In Infrastructure, i.e. dams and highways, and social programs.
I.e. food, health and education, are expected to contribute to the 
growth of the economy and enhance tax revenues through increased pro­
duction. Currently, debt—servicing grows faster than national Income
pp. 55-57, 61-58.
B. Lary, "The Domestic Effects of Foreign Investment," 
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, XXXVI, No. 2 (May, 
1946), 672-686.
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and export earnings. Â net transfer of resources from the debtor to 
the creditor is then possible as debt-servicing claims an increasing 
share of foreign exchange. Mikesell even questions the possibility
of developing countries ever achieving self-generating growth without 
first " . . .  going through a period of defaults or requiring general 
debt forgiveness.
The following examples describe the influence of the struc­
ture of debt on the transfer of resources. If gross lending is main­
tained at a constant amount, it is possible that debt-service payments 
will eventually exceed gross lending and the net transfer of resources 
from donor to aid recipient will decline and become negative. For 
example, if $100 is loaned each year on hard terms of 5 1/2 per cent 
interest, 13 year maturity, and 3 years grace period, the net transfer 
will be zero after 9 years and negative thereafter because of debt- 
servicing. On IDA terms of 3/4 of 1 per cent, 50 year maturity, and 
10 year grace, the net transfer will decrease to $90 the 10th year 
and decrease steadily thereafter.^®®
To maintain a constant level of net resource inflow, gross 
lending must increase, the rate of increase depending on the terms of
197Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, pp. 122-126, 265- 
269. Also, Goran Ohlin, Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered (Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1966), p. 92; 
World Bank, Annual Report 1968 in Leading Issues in Economic Develop­
ment ed. by Meier, pp. 269-273.
198Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, p. 265.
^®®Ibid.. Figure 2, p. 109.
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of the loans. To maintain an annual net Inflow of $100 the size of 
loan by the 10th year must be $109 on IDA terms and $270 on hard 
terms. Any Increase in the loan exceeding the $100 is necessary to 
cover the interest and amortization payments on debt accumulated over 
the 10 year period to maintain the annual $100 net inflow.
Growth of Debt-Service Charges
Debt-servicing charges increase rapidly because of what Jacob 
Viner calls the " . . .  wondrous working of compound interest.
Theories developed to explain this phenomenon and its application to 
development aid are surveyed,
Hal Lary^°^
One of the first writers to direct attention to the debt- 
servicing problem on long-term, developmental loans was Hal Lary. His 
model demonstrates the growth in debt servicing and eventual net inflow 
of resources to the lending country on a portfolio of investments and 
loans. A portfolio of $50 billion, composed of $10 billion in invest­
ment and $40 billion in 30—year loans, to be disbursed over a 20—year 
period, would be yielding the lender a net return of $2.5 billion in 
19 years.
^^^Ibid., Figure 3, p. 110. Also, Meier, "Improving the 
Quality of Aid— Note," in Leading Issues in Economic Development, ed. by 
Meier, p. 291.
^^^Ohlin, Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered, p. 105.
^^^Hal B. Lary, "The Domestic Effects of Foreign Investment," 
American Economic Review; Papers and Proceedings, XXVI, No. 2 (May, 
1946), 672-686.
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Evsey Domar^^^
Domar's model also illustrates the relationship between the 
inflow and outflow of funds from the vantage point of the lender. The 
inflow of resources (amortization plus interest payments) for the 
lender first approaches and then exceeds the outflow of new investment, 
reaching the limit and stabilizing: (amortization rate + interest rate)/ 
(amortization rate + rate of growth of new lending). The faster new 
lending grows, the smaller will be the ratio between the inflow and the 
outflow of funds. If the rate of growth in lending exceeds the interest 
rate, this ratio will be less than one, and a net inflow for the lender 
will never arise. If, however, the rate of growth of new lending, falls 
below the rate of interest, a net inflow will become inevitable.
This is particularly applicable to the developing countries 
today who borrow to pay debt-servicing. A great deal of growth and 
development must take place in the borrowing economy to achieve self- 
sufficienty to the point of tolerating the eventual repayment and net 
outflow of resources and the slowing down in the rate of new borrowing.
Randall Hinshaw^^^
To sustain an export surplus of $1 billion per year through 
lending, donor countries must increase gross lending annually since it
^^^Evsey D. Domar, "The Effect of Foreign Investment on the 
Balance of Payments," American Economic Review. XL (December, 1950), 
805-826.
^^^Randall Hinshaw, "International Investment: Foreign Invest­
ment and American Employment," American Economic Review: Papers and 
Proceedings, XXXVI, No. 2 (May, 1946), 661-671.
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will be necessary to lend interest as well as principal. From the 
developing countries point of view, if imports annually exceed exports 
by $1 billion, indebtedness will grow rapidly, depending on the rate 
of interest charged. The growth in debt is the result of the 
importer's borrowing Interest payments. For a country to run a 
balance-of-payments deficit of $1 billion, after 25 years it must 
borrow $4.41 billion at 2 per cent, $5,9 billion at 4 per cent, and 
$8.9 billion at 6 per cent using 20-year loans.
This model portrays a realistic situation for developing
countries. For example, assume (1) $20 billion (net of amortization)
is annually loaned at 5 per cent interest, and (2) the U.S. imports
of $10 billion a year from the debtor country. The developing country
receives $30 billion annually. At the end of 30 years all dollars
accruing to the debtor country will be owed to the U.S. as interest.
Beyond 30 years, the flow of dollars will be inadequate even to pay
the Interest c h a r g e s . T h e  geometric increase of debt is the result
of borrowing to service debt. Net repayment of debt will take place
only as the country moves from one stage of development to a more 
207advanced stage.
205Ibid., based on Tables 3 and 4, pp. 666-667.
^^^Ibid.. pp. 667-668.
^^^Charles P. Kindleberger, The Dollar Shortage (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1950), pp. 74—75.
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Goran Ohlin^^^
This model deals specifically with the growth of debt-
servicing when the balance-of-payments gap is increasing. If the
gap is increasing at a steady rate, fe, the rate at which the debt
will grow is determined by either (1) the rate of growth of the gap fe,
or C2) the rate of interest, -t.
If k  then the ratio of net lending to gross lending, W ,
will approach a stable level:
n  =  ^ ~ _ net lending
k  +  a  gross lending
where CL is the amortization rate.
If Â. >  k  then debt servicing will absorb increasing portions 
of the capital inflow and n  will decline and approach zero. A net 
inflow will be maintained only if the rate of growth of new loans 
exceeds the rate of interest. It is only through the large increase 
in debt that the decreasing fraction of net Inflow will be adequate to 
cover the increasing balance-of-payments gap.
The conclusion, therefore, is that if a country faces a grow­
ing resource gap which is to be met by borrowing, the growth of debt 
is determined by the rate of growth of the gap k  , the interest rate -c, 
and the amortization rate a .
Debt Servicing Capacity 
The most common statistics used in estimating the debt-servic­
ing capacity of developing countries are the rate of return on investment
^^^Goran Ohlin, Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered (Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1966).
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debt—service / export earnings ratios, and the growth of national 
Income, reflecting the fact that the most significant consideration 
Is the overall performance of the economy and the entire development 
program. The Irony of the situation Is that the level of poverty and 
need for assistance standards used In qualifying a country for aid 
often are such that a country qualifying for aid has no debt-servicing
209capacity even though debt-servicing Is a prerequisite for further aid.
Debt—servicing capacity depends. In part, on the selection
of appropriate Investment which will Increase productivity and generate
economic growth. Capital should be allocated according to the highest
social marginal product. Strategic Investments can be made which will
Increase domestic savings and stimulate export Industries to permit
210a continued Increase In exports.
The second factor, export earnings. Indicates the close 
relationship between trade and debt-servicing capacity. Inadequate 
export earnings Increase the ratio of debt-service payments to foreign 
exchange receipts. Aid Is expected to expand export capacity to pro­
vide a surplus of foreign exchange. It Is not essential that the 
Investment of foreign capital create Its own means of payment directly
since the development of one sector Influences the development of other 
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Meier, Leading Issues in Economic Development, p. 269. 
Also, Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, pp. 105-126; Ward, 
Development Issues for the 1970*s, pp. 111-112.
^^^Meler, International Trade and Development, pp. 108-111. 
Also, Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, pp. 119-120.
^^^eler. International Trade and Development, pp. 108-111.
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Since aid recipients are expected to eventually achieve 
self-sustained growth and become able to repay the debt, the growth 
of national income is necessary. Raymond Mikesell developed a formula 
to define the "critical rate of interest" which establishes the max­
imum percentage of national income which interest payments can reach 
before absorbing intolerable amounts of domestic product. This 
critical rate of interest, ' i  , depends upon:
1. The Initial and marginal savings rates, 4^ and 4 .
2. The incremental capital-output ratio, k  .
3. The desired rate of growth in GDP, A, .
i g  -  k A
This rate allows the debt to increase at the same rate as GDP.
The crucial role of the MPS can be seen by examining a case 
in which the savings rate is equal to the desired investment rate.
Here a deficiency would increase at compound interest since the 
country would always have to borrow to pay the interest.
The role of the growth in national income in determining debt- 
servicing burden is also demonstrated by Evsey Domar in a study of 
three cases. It is assumed in all three cases that the government 
borrowing is 6 per cent of the national income and the interest rate 
is 2 per cent, the only difference in the three cases being the growth 
rate of national income.
^^^likesell. The Economics of Foreign Aid, p. 121.
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If national Income remains constant, 14.25 per cent is used 
to pay interest after 100 years. If national income increases at 
$5 billion per year, the percentage of national income to service the 
debt increases more slowly and absorbs only 7.57 per cent of national 
income after 100 years. In national income increases at a constant 
2 per cent, the percentage of national income required to pay interest 
does not increase indefinitely but approaches a limit, in this case, 
of 5.71 per cent. At the end of 100 years the percentage of national 
income servicing debt is only 5.49 per cent compared to 7.57 and 
14.25 per cent in the other cases.
Current, Historical, and Empirical Nature 
of Debt-Servicing Problems
The Current Situation
The increasing balance-of-payments deficits covered by borrow­
ing, especially short-term private credit, have brought attention from 
financial leaders all over the world. Arthur F. Burns made the state­
ment following an International Monetary Fund (IMF) conference:
"Some foreign governments are running ’frightening’ deficits that ’have 
to be brought under control’" . H e  cautioned against a world-wide 
overexpansion of credit:
There is a tendency (in some countries) to run governmental 
deficits on a huge scale and to pile new debt on top of old
^^^Evsey Domar, "The ’Burden of the Debt’ and the National 
Income," American Economic Review, XXXIV, No. 4 (December, 1944), 
798-827.
^^^"Fed Chief Says Some Nations Must Curb ’Frightening’ 
Deficits to Slow Inflation," Wall Street Journal, quoting Arthur 
Bums, June 21, 1976, p. 7.
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debt . . .  1 think some of that has been overdone . . .  Some 215 
countries around the world may be excessively In debt already.
Annual deficits of developing countries Increased from $10 billion In
1973 to $28 billion in 1974 and $37 billion in 1975.^^®
These deficits have required extraordinary borrowing from the
IBRD, IMR, regional development banks and from private lenders. The
external public debt outstanding of the 86 developing countries
Increased to $118.9 billion during 1973, an Increase of $18,9 billion 
217from 1972. This debt will burden the countries with heavy repay­
ments for years to come, much of It being expensive credit from private 
banks•
William E. Simon, U.S. Treasury Secretary speaking to the
Joint Conference of IMF and IBRD In Manila In October, 1976, warns of
the seriousness of the continuing deficits and growing debt:
As debt grows to finance the continuing deficits, an Increasing 
number of countries which have delayed adjustment (of their 
economies) will approach limits beyond which they cannot afford 
to borrow and beyond which prudent lenders won't lend to them.
This is a serious matter and It can't be Ignored by lenders or 
borrowers.
The need for better financing of the massive deficits in International 
payments by developing countries was one of the major topics discussed 
at the Conference.
^^^"Debt Will Clearly Dominate Thinking of IMF, World Bank 
Meeting Delegates," Wall Street Journal, October 4, 1976, p. 7,
217World Bank, Annual Report 1975. Table 4, p. 91.
^^^"IMF Members Warned on Using Credit to Hide Domestic Econ^ 
omlc Weaknesses," Wall Street Journal, October 5, 1976, p. 12.
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The most recent Increase in deficits can be attributed 
primarily to the increased price of imports, especially oil and ter—
tilizer which added $10 billion a year to the cost of imported
energy for these countries, and decreased export earnings which
decreased when both the prices of and demand for exports decreased
220due to the recession of industrialized countries.
Countries experiencing persistent deficits are told to look
internally and review domestic policies:
Countries with large, persistent deficits in their international 
accounts are headed for trouble if they continue papering over 
their problems with borrowed money instead of strengthening 
their domestic e c o n o m i e s . 221
Speakers at the 1976 IMF and IBRD Conferences suggested deficit
countries restrain domestic demand, permit the shift of resources to
the external sector to increase exports (to hold down debt), and rely
less on borrowing, especially high-cost, short-maturity credits 
222from private banks.
Because of the build-up of debt-servicing payments a great 
deal of attention has been given recently to the possibility of resched­
uling of debt, default, and a moratorium on debt.^^^ Two major topics
^^^"All But the Poorest of Developing Nations Maintain High 
Growth, World Bank Says," Wall Street Journal, September 23, 1976, p. 6. 
Also, "Developing Debt. Emerging Nations Use Private Lenders More, 
Causing Some Worries," Wall Street Journal, September 28, 1976, pp. 1, 
26; Wall Street Journal, October 4, 1976.
^^^all Street Journal, October 5, 1976, p. 12.
223*'North-South Talks Sponsored by the UN Are Showing First 
Signs of Compromise," Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1976, p. 7- Also,
Wall Street Journal, October 4, September 28, 1976.
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of discussion at the May 1976 Conference were:
1. International guarantees of private loans to developing 
countries which would provide cheaper and more plentiful 
financing by private banks who now consider themselves 
overcommitted to Third World borrowers.
2. Special treatment for the world’s poorest nations, perhaps 
Including forgiveness of their debts to governments, and 
provision for all future government aid to be nonrepay-
abl..:24
No resolutions were passed at this time although both topics 
continue to be discussed at other conferences. Although Individual 
cases of rescheduling take place, a widespread moratorium or default 
on debt is considered unlikely by bankers, ”. . .  credit Is too Impor­
tant to the developing countries for them to take action that could 
destroy It.
Private credit
One of the disturbing features of the current debt structure 
Is the Increase In lending by private Institutions for purposes pre­
viously extended by governmental agencies. Previously private credit 
was extended only for specific objectives:
. . .  to facilitate trade or to develop specific revenue-generating 
projects— both areas where risks can be judged with some confidence 
and where the means of repayment are clear. Much of the new lend­
ing, Is for the general purposes of the borrowing government chiefly 
to finance deficits in Its balance-of-payments with other countries.
^^^Wall Street Journal, May 10, September 28, 1976.
225Wall Street Journal. September 28, 1976.
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Prospects of collecting on the d^t depend on the economic health 
of the country, which is difficult to forecast, also on the will­
ingness to repay on the part of the country's leaders, who may not 
be the same people who obtained the l o a n . 226
But concern with this type of lending Is not due only to 
debt-servicing problems but also to private financing, unplanned and 
unregulated. Involving bankers In the internal affairs of a country.
The current trend In private lending will lead to "bunching 
of maturities." Loans with 10-year maturities were common In 1973 
but In 1975 most loans carried maturities of 3-5 years. This means 
In certain years, 1980 for example, loan repayments will be heavy as 
schedules coincide. It will create problems for some countries and 
requests for restructure of payment schedules can be expected.
Historical Evolution of Debt- 
Servicing Problems
Today's concern for debt-servicing capacity stems. In part, 
from the unforgotten massive defaults on foreign loans in the 1930's. 
However, a close look at the lending prior to this period of default 
will reveal a huge flow of resources back to the U.S. In Interest and 
dividend payments. During 1924-1930, the average annual gross outflow 
of private resources was $1,214 million but the net outflow was only 
$764 million since $266 million returned In amortization and $184 
million In net sales by the U.S. of outstanding foreign securities. 
This $764 million was almost entirely offset by a reverse flow of
"=Ibld.
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$754 million In dividends and interest, resulting in a net outflow 
from the U.S. of only $10 million. By 1930 American interest receipts 
from private long-term forei^ loans amounted to $429 million as com- 
pared with $87 million in 1919. ^
The plight developing countries find themselves in today is 
not of the same nature of the 1924—1930 era but it was accurately pre­
dicted. Although writers in the 1940*s foresaw the long-run debt- 
servicing problems which developing countries would encounter if care­
ful attention was not given to the debt structure, the trend of the 
1960's toward increased use of private credit and harder terms of
official lending does not indicate that the warnings of the earlier 
230writers were heeded.
Many changes have taken place in international lending from 
the 1920*s to the present. During the 1920-1940 period, most lending 
was by the private sector with the returns being both interest and 
dividends. Following World War II, the U.S. government made recon­
struction loans. The economies being restored had experienced economic 
progress and the basic framework of growth, development, and trade was 
already firmly fixed in the minds of the l e a d e r s . B u t  with the
^^^Hinshaw, "International Investment," 661-671-
^^pArthur I. Bloomfield, "Postwar Control of International 
Capital Movements,** American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings, 
XXXVI, No. 2 (May, 1946), 687-709. Also, Hinshaw, "International 
Investment," 661-671.
J. J. Folak, ''Balance of Payments Problems of Countries 
Reconstructing with the Help of Foreign Loans," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, LVIX (November, 1942), 208-240. Also, Raymond F, Mikesell 
and J. J. Polak, "International Investment—Discussion, ** American 
Economic Review, XXXVI, No. 2 (May, 1946), 710-715.
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event of the development loan, the borrower was ”. . .  politically 
unstable • —  - unfamiliar to the Western investor, commercially, 
legally, socially, and politically. The development loans 
encouraged changes which had never been experienced.
As the type of lender changed from private to government 
during the 1946-1952 era, most of the governmental transfers of 
resources were in the form of grants. However, from 1955 to the 
present, the type of aid has changed from grants to loans, with 
debt-servicing payments accounting for an increasing proportion of 
export earnings, increasing from $0-8 billion in 1955 to $11 billion 
in 1973.233
Empirical Aspect of the Debt- 
Servicing Problems
• Some of the problems most closely associated with the current 
debt—servicing problems are the nature of the debt and debt-service 
payments, i.e. size, structure, composition, and the foreign exchange 
constraint.
The distribution of the outstanding external public debt,
using GNP as an indication of debt-servicing capacity, indicates that
the countries with the weakest debt-servicing capacity carry the largest
234percentage of debt relative to capacity.
^^^Pincus, Economic Aid and International Cost Sharing, pp. 34.
^^^World Bank, Annual Report 1975, Table 8, p. 97.
^^^United Nations, Conference on Trade and Development, Debt 
Problems in the Context of Development; Report by the UNCTAD Secre­
tariat (TD/B/C.3/109/Rev. 1), 1974, pp. 5-6.
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TABLE 22
COMPARISON OF DEBT OUTSTANDING ON A PER CAPITA BASIS, 1971
Income Per 
Capita
C$)
Number of 
Countries
Percent of 
Total Debt
a)
Percent of 
Total GNP 
(2)
Ratio
(l)/(2)
100 or less 15 9.5 4.2 2.26
101 - 200 17 23.6 21.7 1.09
201 - 300 14 11.9 10.4 1.14
301 - 500 18 28.7 26.0 1.10
501 + 17 26.2 37.7 .69
Source: United Nations, Debt Problems in the Context of Dev­
elopment: Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat (TD/B/C.3/ 
109/Rev. 1), 1974, based on Table 2, p. 6.
The terms of the loans have increasingly been hardened with 
a marked increase in the interest rate and decrease in grant element.
TABLE 23
AVERAGE TERMS AND GRANT ELEMENT OF LOAN COMMITMENTS®
Year
Maturity
(years)
Grace
(years)
Interest
(Z)
Grant Element^ 
(%)
1967 16.8 4.4 4.3 36
1968 19.0 4.6 4.4 37
1969 18.1 4.4 4.8 34
1970 19.7 5.2 4.9 35
1971 17.8 4.6 5.1 32
1972 17.6 4.6 5.2 32
1973 18.9 5.0 5.9 28
Average 18.27 4.7 4.94 33.4
Total % Change 
1967-1973 +12.5 + 13.6 +37.2 - 22.2 ,,
Eighty-six developing countries.
^Discounted at 10 % rate.
Source: World Bank, Annual Report 1975, Table 9, p- 98.
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More recently, the terms on both U.S. Export—Import Bank and 
the World Bank have been hardened. In an effort to reduce export­
er edit competition among developed countries, the U.S. Export—Import 
Bank increased the down payment from 10 per cent to 15 per cent July 
1, 1976. The interest rates of 8 1/4 to 9 1/2 per cent and maximum 
maturities of 10 years for developing countries and 8 1/2 years for 
industrial countries remained unchanged. The World Bank increased
interest rates from 8.5 to 8.9 per cent, reduced the grace periods 
from 5 to 3 - 4 years, and decreased total maturity from 20 years 
to 15-^^^ Over this same time period, the composition of debt changed 
with the portion of total lending obtained from private sources, which 
has no concessionary features, increasing relative to the official.
TABLE 24
PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL LENDING COMPARED®
Private Official
Year Private Official Total (% of Total) (% of Tc
1967 14.7 36.1 50.8 28.9 71.1
1968 16.2 41.1 57.2 28.3 71.7
1969 18.8 45.3 64.1 29.3 70.7
1970 21.8 51.9 73.7 29.6 70.4
1971 26.3 59.9 86.1 30.5 69.5
1972 30.8 69.2 100.0 30.8 69.2
1973 38.5 80.4 118.9 32.4 67.6
^In U.S. $ billions. External public debt outstanding for 
86 developing countries.
Source: World Bank, Annual Report 1975, Table 4, p. 91.
235'*u.s, Ex-Im Bank Tightens Terms on Export Loans," Wall 
Street Journal, June 10, 1976, p. 10.
236yall Street Journal, October 4, 1976, p. 7.
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The reverse flow of resources in the form of interest pay­
ments and amortization decreases the net transfer of resources. From 
1967 to 1973 debt servicing Increased from $4 billion to $11 billion, 
a 173 per cent increase. See Table 25. This trend will continue 
during the 1970’s as grace periods expire and repayment begins and 
as the use of private credit Increases, bringing with it even harder 
terms.
TABLE 25
TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS AND DEBT SERVICE^
Year
Debt Service
Total Disburse--------
ment (grants Amorti-
(& loans) zation Interest Total
Debt Service 
as a Percent 
of Total Dis­
bursement
1967 10,853.1 2,917.3 1,104.3 4,021.6 34.0
1968 11,445.6 3.381.9 1,291.8 4,673.7 40.8
1969 12,006.3 3,728.7 1,539.7 5,268.4 43.9
1970 13,498.4 4,348.4 1,878.5 6,226.9 46.1
1971 14,896.7 4,769.1 2,168.5 6,937.0 46.6
1972 18,804.8 5,875.9 2,512.8 8,388.8 44.6
1973 23,739.6 7,685.4 3,316.6 11,002.0 46.3
In U.S. $ millions.
Source: World Bank, Annual Report 1975, Table 8, p. 97.
Of the total debt—service payments over this time period. 
Interest payments increased by 200.3 per cent and amortization pay­
ments by 163 per cent while total disbursements increased by only 
118.6 per cent. Debt-servicing absorbed almost half of total disburse­
ments by 1973, increasing from 34 per cent in 1967 to 46,3 per cent 
in 1973-
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The net transfer of resources Increased slowly, even declin­
ing in 1968 and 1969 in spite of annual increases in total disburse­
ments. Even though total disbursements grew by.118.7 per cent, most 
of the increase was in loans rather than grants. This increased the 
portion of funds required to service debt and resulted in an increase 
in net transfer of only 86.4 per cent over this 7 year period. See 
Table 26.
TABLE 26 
DISBURSEMENTS AND NET TRANSFER®
Disbursements
Year Loans Grants Total Net Transfer
1967 7,885.3 2,967.8 10,853.1 6,831.5
1968 8,651.3 2,794.2 11,445.6 6,771.9
1969 9,129.1 2,877.2 12,006.3 6,737.8
1970 10,667.5 2,830.9 13,498.4 7,271.5
1971 11,824.8 3,071.9 14,896.7 7,959.1
1972 15,187.9 3,616.9 18,804.8 10,416.0
1973 20,164.5 3,575.1 23,739.6 12,737.6
In U.S. $ millions.
Source: World Bank, Annual Report 1975, Table 8, p. 97.
Foreign exchange constraint
In order to service debt and eventually repay it, a resource
transfer to the creditor country must be made. The two major sources
of foreign exchange for a developing country are export earnings and
237foreign capital inflow, specifically development assistance.
^^^United Nations, Debt Problems in the Context of Develop­
ment, pp. 111-117.
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Export earnings
Development programs are expected to Increase productivity 
and foreign exchange earnings sufficiently to repay the loan. How­
ever, the earnings may be inadequate because of factors affecting cost, 
external demand, supply or price of the export production. The 
developing countries* share of the world export market has remained 
relatively stable over the past seven year period, the only signifi­
cant change being the 1974 increase due to oil exports. The 1963-1968 
average was 19 per cent of the world market and the 1969-1974 share 
had increased to 20 per cent even when including the 1974 increase to 
26 per cent of the market. See Table 27.
TABLE 27
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' SHARE OF WORLD EXPORT MARKET®
Year
Total World 
Exports
Developing Coun­
tries Exports Ratio
av. 1963-1968 194,965 37,120 19.0
1969 272,760 48,640 17.8
1970 313,200 55,010 17.6
1971 350,100 62,240 17.7
1972 416,790 75,010 18.0
1973 571,520 108,480 19.0
1974 864,240 225,810 26.1
av. 1969-1974 464,768 95,865 20.0
®In U.S. 
Source:
$ millions.
World Bank. Annual Report 1975, pp. 88-89.
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One measure used In determining debt—service capacity and the 
foreign exchange constraint is the portion of export earnings absorbed 
by debt-servicing. For the five years 1969-1973, debt service has 
averaged 10.9 per cent of export earnings for 86 developing countries.
TABLE 28 
DEBT SERVICE RATIO TO EXPORTS®
Year Exports Debt Service Ratio
1969 48,640 5,268.4 10.8
1970 55,010 6,226.9 11.3
1971 62,240 6,937.6 11.1
1972 75,010 8,388.8 11.2
1973 108,480 11,002.0 11.1
Average 69,876 7,565.5 10,9
Source: Calculated from World Bank, Annual Report
1975, Table 2, pp. 88-89 and Table 4, p, 91.
Aggregates, however, often do not reveal the debt-servicing 
position for specific countries. In Table 29, the debt—service 
ratios are given for selected countries, reflecting the highest 
ratios or rapid changes, for 1965-1973. The annual average debt- 
service ratios for these countries increased over this time period, 
changing from 16,8 in 1965 to 19.9 in 1973.
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TABLE 29 
DEBT-SERVICING RATIOS
Country 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Egypt 15.2 15.5 19.5 19.4 24.5 26.2 19.4 31.5 34.6
Zambia 4.2 2.2 2.4 2.7 1.9 5.1 10.0 10.7 28.0
Israel 23.7 22.6 15.7 16.9 17.2 18.6 13.4 17.7 20.8
India 15.4 19.1 24.9 25.1 26.5 28.0 25.9 24.5 20.1
Turkey 20.3 20.5 16.4 20.0 19.2 22.5 19.0 18.8 10.4
Argentina 20.2 25.5 25.9 28.3 24.1 21.0 19.5 20.3 18.3
Brazil 20.9 21.9 16.0 15.6 16.6 15.3 15.8 14.3 13.9
Colombia 14.4 16.5 14.2 13.1 11.8 11.9 14.8 12.6 13.0
Dominican 19.2 12.6 7.3 7.7 8.6 5.1 6.7 4.1 4.5
Republic
Mexico 24.8 21.9 23.8 26.3 23.3 25.2 24.1 23.5 25.2
Uruguay 6.9 12.5 17.0 18.9 18.5 18.4 22.2 34.0 30.1
Average 16.8 17.3 16.6 17.6 17.5 17.9 17.3 19.3 19.9
Source: World Bank, Annual Report 1975. Table 6, p. 94.
Also, United Nations, Debt Problems in the Context 
of Development. Table 4, pp. 31-33,
Development assistance
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members set a tar­
get of providing development assistance equal to 1 per cent of their 
GNP,^^® However, these capital flows often have a very low grant 
element. Eorty-five per cent of the flow is not under the control of 
the government at all since it is private credit. The 1 per cent tar­
get includes all items in the account. Net Flow of Financial Resources, 
described in Chapter III, much of It with no concessional element.
Even under these conditions a 1 per cent target has not been achieved. 
See Table 30,
238.Ibid.. p. 2.
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TABLE 30
COMPARATIVE AID-GIVING PERFORMANCE, 1971
Countries
Total Net 
Flows^
Official Development Assistance
Net Transfer Grant Element
United States 0.67 0.30 0.27
Sweden 0.69 0.45 0.43
Canada 0.82 0.37 0.35
Switzerland 1.04 0.12 0.12
Denmark 0.88 0.30 0.29
Germany 0.80 0.43 0.41
France 0.51 0.33 0.33
Norway 1.00 0.64 0.38
Australia 1.27 0.52 0.49
Belgium 1.09 0.50 0.48
Netherlands 1.63 0.57 0.54
United Kingdom 1.15 0.36 0.34
Austria 0.56 0.05 0.06
Japan 0.96 0.20 0.15
Italy 0.85 0.15 0.11
Portugal 2.12 1.35 0.81
Total DAC 0.83 0.33 0.30
Percentage of GNP.
^Countries are ranked in order of per capita GNP.
Pncludes official and private flows.
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Development Co-Operation. 1972 Review. December, 1972, 
Tables 1 and 2, pp. 205-206.
Recommendations for Coping with 
Debt-Servicing Burdens
Rescheduling of Debt
The theoretical implications of debt-servicing can become
real nightmares for some developing countries. Although some guidelines
must be established to prevent the impending disaster, no concensus has
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been reached yet among developed and developing countries as to the 
nature of the problem or the appropriate mechanism for dealing with it.
Rescheduling of debt which has taken place over the past 
twenty years has been under emergency conditions. Negotiations of 
this nature do not give proper attention to the interrelationships 
between debt-servicing, capital flows, and the development program of 
the debtor country nor does it establish appropriate channels for 
meeting future rescheduling needs. Table 31 illustrates the type of 
credit which most often requires rescheduling. The "Date of Agree­
ments" and "Due Date" indicate the immediacy of the need.
A great deal of opposition is voiced to establishing per­
manent debt-relief machinery. The following objections raised and 
responses offered are:
1. Objection: Standards of management may be relaxed and
corrective measures neglected.
Response: Review of the economy and the recommended debt
relief measures could be conducted similar to 
the review made prior to granting aid.
2. Objection: Debt relief will be abused if it is assumed to
be automatic.
Response: Criteria could be established to eliminate the
implication of automaticity.
3. Objection: Short-term commercial borrowing would be con­
verted into long-term debt with a redistribu­
tion of scarce funds to countries with debt 
problems.
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TABLE 31
RESCHEDULING OF EXTERNAL DEBT: 1956-1968
Debtor Country and Type of Due Date of Re­
Date of Agreement Debt scheduled Debt
Argentina
May 30, 1956 Suppliers’ Credits June 30, 1965
Oct. 24, 1962 1963-1964
June 26, 1965 Insured Supp. Cred.; Gov. Loans 1965
Brazil
May 24, 1961 Suppliers' Credits 6/1961 - 12/1965
July 1, 1964 1964 - 1965
Turkey
May 11, 1959 Suppliers' Credits 8/1958 - 1/1964
March 27, 1965 Gov. Loans : Consolidated Supp. Cred 1964 — 1967
Chile
Feb. 24, 1965 Suppliers' Credits; Gov. Loans 1965 - 1966
Ghana
Dec. 9, 1966 Insured Suppliers' Credits 6/1966 - 12/1968
Oct. 22, 1968 1/1969 - 7/1972
Indonesia
Dec. 20, 1966 Ins. Suppliers' Cred.; Gov. Loans 6/1966 - 12/1967
Oct. 18, 1967 II  II II  II II 1968
Oct. 17, 1968 II II I I  II  II 1969
India
May 24, 1968 To Be Det. by Bilateral Agreement 4/1968 - 4/1969
Peru
Sept. 27, 1968 Suppliers' Credits 4/1968 - 12/1969
Source: Compile^ from Lester B, Pearson, Partners In Develop­
ment. Report of the Commission on International 
Development (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 
1969), Table 20, Annex II: Statistical Material, 
pp. 383-384.
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4. Objection: Relief for suppliers’ credits acts as a sub­
sidy to export credits and undermines com­
petition in international markets.
Response: Export credits finance development programs,
are included in a donor's "total flow of
external resources," and increase when aid 
239funds decrease.
The existing multilateral institutions become involved with an 
Individual country’s debt-servicing ability at various points:
1. The IBRD when the issue is the long-term development 
impact of capital flows.
2. The IMF when the balance-of-payments is affected.
3. The DAC when the assistance performance of each donor 
is evaluated.
These institutions deal with debt relief on an ad hoc basis and make 
little effort to develop an effective debt strategy. Considering the 
"crisis" orientation of the procedure, meeting debt-service payments 
is the objective and proper attention is not given to the amount of 
assistance required to.attain minimum development objectives.
Over time, rules and procedures have developed in these 
ad hoc conferences which require the debtor to make a stand-by agree­
ment with the IMF and to design a stabilization program as a
^^^Dnited Nations, Debt Problems in the Context of Development, 
pp. 18-20.
pp. 20-21.
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pre-condition of obtaining debt relief. However, these conditions 
are concerned primarily with enabling the debtor to resume debt pay­
ments. An international policy is needed to assist in reorganizing
debt. Procedures should be established to:
1. Identify potential debt difficulties before the crisis.
2. Apply appropriate measures without long delays.
3. Recognize the economic conditions of the debtor and pro­
spects for new flows of assistance when setting the terms 
and degree of concessionality.
4. Integrate debt-relief with development programs to allow 
the process of development to continue.
5. Insure equal treatment of all debtors.
6. Insure equitable distribution of the burden of providing 
debt relief.
In summary, a new approach to debt relief would require an 
institutional arrangement, criteria for determining eligibility and 
guidelines for action.
Interest Subsidy Fund
Two fundamental issues to be resolved in the Interest Subsidy 
Fund are (1) the method of financing the Fund and (2) the criteria for 
distributing the funds.
242Ibid.. pp. 1-2, 18-24. Also, United Nations, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, Debt Problems of Developing Coun­
tries. Report of the Ad hoc Group of Governmental Experts on its 
Third Session, Geneva, February 25 - March 7, 1975, pp. 1-10.
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One approach to financing the Fund^^^ is to allocate the 
burden among the donor countries according to the interest due each 
donor. One of the recommendations to come from the Pearson Report 
is that **• . . donor countries commit the équivalent of one-half or 
more of the interest payments due them on official bilateral loans 
from developing countries to the World Bank to subsidize the interest 
rates on some Bank l e n d i n g . T h i s  approach is criticized since 
debt—servicing difficulties result from a variety of factors, interest 
payments being just one factor. The donor country’s terms of lending 
may not be responsible for the debt-servicing problems of the recipient. 
Therefore, the donor should not be held responsible for an unfair 
commitment to the Interest Subsidy Fund.^^^
Suggestions considered in distribution of interest subsidies 
are: (1) uniformity among developing countries, (2) type of loan, and 
(3) specific criteria to be determined.
World Bank Third Window
Development assistance on terms between those of the Bank 
and IDA would be provided to countries with very low per capita income.
^^^United Nations, Debt Problems in the Context of Develop­
ment, pp. 23-24. The General Assembly Resolution 3039 (XXVII) 
requested a study on the desirability and feasibility fo the establish­
ment of the fund.
^^^Pearson, Partners in Development, p. 222 cited in United 
Nations, Debt Problems in the Context of Development, p. 24.
^^^United Nations, Debt Problems in the Context of Development,
p. 24.
. p. 23.
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This approach is being experimented with at the suggestion of the 
Development C o m m i t t e e . I n  1975 the Third Window was funded with 
$1 billion to lend to countries with less than $375 per capita GNP, 
although countries with higher per capita Incomes should not be 
completely e x c l u d e d , N o  conclusion has been reached at this time 
on the results of the experiment.
Conclusions
The debt—servicing problems facing developing countries today
were brought on by their attempt to achieve economic development faster
than the increase in foreign exchange earnings and domestic saving.
This resulted in countries resorting to export credits on commercial 
terms and accepting tied aid which had a higher effective rate of 
interest than that reflected in the agreements. This increase in debt 
was often at the encouragement of the developed countries who engaged 
in export promotion competition through credit availability.
The conclusion drawn from this introduction to the debt- 
servicing problem is that a concerted effort must be made to coordinate 
the lending policies of the developed countries to prevent debt- 
servicing commitments from exceeding capacity.
Whether examined from the point of view of the decrease in
the net flow of resources or the increase in total indebtedness, the
^Formally the Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of 
Governors of the World Bank and the IMF on the Transfer of Real 
Resources to Developing Countries.
^^^World Bank, Annual Report 1975, p. 14.
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impact of the debt structure on the transfer of resources through 
debt—servicing depends upon the terms of the loan. The less conces­
sionary the terms, the larger and more rapid the increase in debt- 
service payments.
A great deal of theoretical work has been done to determine 
the effect the structure of debt has on the transfer of resources 
through debt-servicing, the rate of growth dLn debt-servicing charges, 
and the capacity of a country to service debt. The conclusion is 
that debt repayment requires a transfer of resources from debtor to 
creditor. This transfer can begin very soon after the initial loan, 
much sooner than the development process increases the productive 
. capacity of the debtor. The possibility of this happening depends 
upon the terms and conditions of the loans and the export earnings 
derived from the productivity of the investment created by the loan.
Repayment schedules on both previously committed, long-term 
obligations and short-term, private credit are "bunching", absorbing 
large amounts of foreign exchange simultaneously. At the same time, 
balance-of-payments deficits for developing countries persist as oil 
prices increase and export earnings fall. However, no international 
mechanism has been established at this time. The solutions are still 
in the "discussion" stage. This situation did not occur over-night. 
It is the culmination of events over the past twenty years.
Countries have faced debt—servicing problems and defaults in 
the past. The major difference in the situation today is the stage 
of development of the debtor country. These countries have never
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experienced development and have questionable debt-servicing capacity. 
The distinction between loans for development purposes and for rebuild­
ing war-torn areas or for private enterprise was made clear from the 
beginning. However, the trend recently has been toward more use of 
private credit, a hardening of official loans, and a "bunching” of 
repayment obligations•
Total external public debt of 86 developing countries 
increased from $50.7 billion to $118.9 billion from 1967-1973 with a 
heavier per capita debt being on low-income countries. The hardening 
of terms on debt is reflected in the grant element decreasing from 
36 to 28 per cent .
The need for an appropriate mechanism for rescheduling debt 
has once again occurred In international finance. The methods for 
coping with debt-servicing in the past can serve as a useful guide but 
as the conditions and circumstances change, the mechanisms and recom­
mendations must be adapted to the relevance of the situation. There 
Is a wide divergence in opinion on the appropriate action to take.
.Among the solutions currently under review are an interest subsidy fund, 
a third window in World Bank lending, rescheduling of debt on an inter­
national bases and restructuring of debt terms and conditions. A great 
deal of work, cooperation and mutually agreed upon principles must 
take place before debt-servicing is a dead issue.
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS
The source of "disillusionment*' with the accomplishments of 
aid» on the part of both the donor and recipient, was found to lie in 
the multifarious objectives of the donor, expectations of what aid 
should accomplish, and the classification of many resource flows 
which had no concessionary element as aid.
Donors often expect economic assistance to accomplish too 
many objectives. It was found in Chapter II that the donor expects 
a single assistance commitment to provide national security, promote 
democratic ideology, bring economic advantage, assist the recipient 
in achieving development, and bring world-wide recognition for 
demonstrating a humanitarian spirit.
Both donor and recipient expect economic development in 
response to assistance commitments. The point is often obscured 
that development is a long-term process and can only proceed at the 
pace at which the people are willing to accept change. If immediate 
results are not evident, the donor is often disillusioned and believes
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the funds have been wasted. The recipient also is often anxious to 
reach self-sustaining growth and is frustrated with the slow growth 
process.
The extent to which assistance can contribute to economic 
development is pointed out in Chapter XI by increasing capital- 
absorptive capacity, overcoming the critical minimum level of invest­
ment, and stimulating economic activity among the various sectors 
of the economy. The basic obstacles to development were found to be 
the savings-investment gap, foreign-exchange constraint, and the 
limited capital-absorptive capacity. It is the consensus of such 
economists as Benjamin Higgins, Hollis Chenery, Alan Strout, Walter 
Rostow, John Fei, D. S. Paauw, and R. I. McKinnon that foreign econ­
omic assistance can help in reducing these obstacles and contribute 
to development.
As mentioned earlier, part of the disillusionment with the 
accomplishments of aid, lies in its definition. The primary objective 
should be achieving self-sustaining growth for the recipient. How­
ever, in Chapter III it becomes clear that the flow of funds from 
developed to developing countries are often military in nature or 
private creditors attempting to maximize profit.
If the definition of aid is restricted to the grant element, 
as suggested in Chapter III, a more accurate measurement of the net 
transfer of resources and a more realistic expectation of aid's 
potential Impact could be held. The discounted present value method­
ology is applied to both loans and grants in Chapter III to measure
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the grant element from both the donor and recipient point of 
view.
One aspect of foreign assistance which does not lend itself 
very easily to grant element measurement is the tied—aid commitment. 
However, it is demonstrated in Chapter III that approximately 80 
per cent of bilateral aid is tied. Also 45 per cent of the account. 
Net Flow of Financial Resources from DAG countries, is private credit, 
usually in the form of export credit, which is definitely tied to 
procurement in the donor country. The excess cost due to price 
differential is estimated in Chapter III., based on United Nations 
case studies to range between 12 and 51 per cent of the value of 
the assistance.
Since aid-tying reduces the grant element, i.e. value of the 
aid commitment, and increases the effective interest rate, it has 
been suggested that the procurement restrictions be reduced or 
eliminated. The motives and balance-of-payments effects of aid tying 
and untying are explored in Chapter IV .
Donor countries started tying aid and encouraging the use 
of export credits in an effort to reduce balance-of-payments 
deficits through increased exports. The financial arrangement 
was just one part of the push to expand exports. However, no 
evidence was available at the time the policy was enacted to determine 
the effectiveness in alleviating balance-of-payments pressure.
One of the first studies to estimate the balance-of-payments 
effects of procurement restrictions was conducted by the Brookings 
Institution in 1963- This and other studies conducted through the
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1960’s and early 1970's are surveyed in Chapter IV. The conclusions 
reached are zany. The most Important conclusions are:
1. Substitution of aid funds for free foreign exchange 
purchases may take place and result in no additional 
exports for the donor at all. The extent of substitution 
depends on the trade relation which the donor has with 
the recipient.
2. Funds which leak to a nondonor country may eventually 
return to the donor through normal trade routes, again 
depending on the donor's trade relations with the rest 
of the world.
3. The monetary-fiscal policies enacted by the donor country 
determines the extent to which a decrease in exports can 
curtail a donor's imports and thereby correct a balance— 
of payments deficit.
4. The cooperation of the community of donor countries in 
multilaterally eliminating procurement restrictions is a 
key factor in the balance-of-payments impact of untying 
aid for any one country.
5. The most significant conclusion, evident throughout 
Chapter IV, is the importance of maintaining a competitive 
position in normal trade channels. If this is practiced, 
there would be very little need for procurement restric­
tions or concern over untying aid.
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Since procurement restrictions increase the effective 
interest rate and reduce the grant element, demonstrated in Chapter 
III, this practice contributes to the debt-servicing problems explored 
in Chapter V. Also, since the primary purpose of the procurement 
restrictions in balance-of-payments support for the donor country, 
evident in Chapter IV, the objectives of assistance explored in 
Chapter II appear heavily weighed in favor of protection of economic 
interest of the donor. The terms and structure of economic assistance 
are explored in Chapter V and it is apparent that a large portion 
of assistance returns to the donor in debt-servicing. For example, 
in Chapter V, it is shown that 46 per cent of the $23.7 billion total 
disbursements in 1973 was returned to creditor countries in interest 
and amortization on past debt.
Developing countries are required to use an increasing amount 
of their foreign exchange earnings to service debt commitments. In 
conjunction with this problem, the scheduling of debt maturities 
are coinciding in such a manner that in some years debt—servicing 
burdens will absorb a disproportionate amount of foreign exchange 
earnings.
A few countries have experienced debt rescheduling but 
attention is brought to the lack of a proper mechanism for dealing 
with this newly developing situation in Chapter V. In the past, the 
institutions were capable of dealing with isolated problems as they 
occurred. However, as mounting debt pressures force countries to
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request rescheduling of the debf, it is essential that new institutional 
arragements be established. To solve the debt problems of developing 
countries, donor countries must cooperate by coordinating the terms and 
structure of debt.
In conclusion, the principal findings are: (1) the stated objec­
tives of donors often deviate from the objectives made obvious in the 
design of the aid programs, (2) theoretical conclusions regarding the 
effectiveness of aid in the development process may not materialize due 
to the design of the aid programs, (3) the grant element is reduced 
significantly and the effective rate of interest increased in assistance 
programs due to procurement restrictions and the structuring of debt.
The recommendations are: (1) a more realistic evaluation of 
objectives and expectations regarding assistance, (2) design of the assist­
ance programs to increase the effectiveness of the assistance, (3) an 
awareness of the pending debt—servicing crises of recipient countries 
and establishment of international mechanism for dealing with debt 
rescheduling.
In the final analysis, the disillusionment is based on the lack 
of understanding of the grant element in congressional appropriations 
for assistance and the flow of financial resources labeled assistance.
In fact, a statement attached to the appropriations indicating the 
specifications regarding procurement restrictions, repayment terms, 
and probable return flow of resources through trade could Improve 
understanding of the true cost of the assistance and provide a more 
accurate basis for decision-making. A similar calculation by the aid 
recipient would result in the recipient's choice among alternative sources 
of financing, in cases where alternatives are available.
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